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Abstract
Physicians practicing in capitation-based Family Health Organizations and fee-for-servicebased Family Health Groups receive bonuses for delivering preventive care, including
cervical cancer screening, while those practicing in the traditional fee-for-service model do
not. Financial incentives were introduced to increase Ontario’s cervical screening rate to
85%. To date, the impact of incentives for cervical screening on screening rate and costeffectiveness have not been assessed. Patient-level data obtained from the Institute for
Clinical Evaluative Sciences were used to estimate primary care model screening rates and
cancer treatment costs. A microsimulation model was developed from published cervical
cancer natural history models and parameterized using Ontario data. My results show
significant differences in Pap smear rates across primary care model type, and that financial
incentives are associated with slightly greater quality-adjusted life years. In conclusion,
primary care models featuring incentives are associated with higher screening rates and
appear cost-effective compared to the traditional FFS model.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

1.1 Cervical Cancer
Cervical cancer is a chronic disease caused by persistent infection with human
papillomavirus (HPV) in the epithelial cells of the cervical transformation zone. The
cervix connects the vagina to the uterus and has two main parts: the exocervix and the
endocervix. The transformation zone is where the cervical epithelial cells change from
glandular cells of the endocervix to squamous cells of the exocervix.
While infection with HPV is a necessary cause for cervical cancer, infections are
common and the majority regress spontaneously [1,2]. The outcome of an infection is
largely dependent on HPV type [3,4]. Although around 40 HPV types are known to infect
the genital tract, about 15 types are considered to have a high-risk of developing cervical
cancer [3-5]. The most prevalent types among cervical cancer cases are HPV-16 and
HPV-18 representing 70% of cases [5]. Low-risk types are usually associated with benign
changes in the cervical epithelium, but cervical intraepithelial neoplasia (CIN) may be
associated with a low-risk type [6].
Infection occurs when the virus binds to and enters the basal epithelial cells of the
cervical transformation zone [5,7]. Infection may cause increased basal and suprabasal
cell proliferation, which may eventually lead to lesion formation in the cervix [5]. Most
infections and lesions are transient and clear on their own [8]. However persistent
infection may cause the development of neoplastic cells if the viral genome is integrated
into the host chromosome [7]. There are two main types of cervical cancer: squamous
cell carcinoma (SCC) accounts for approximately 85% of cases and adenocarcinoma
(AC) accounts for 15-20% [9,10]. Women with a persistent infection of the squamous
cells with one or more high-risk type may develop low-grade squamous intraepithelial
lesions (LSIL). These lesions are indicative of mild to moderate cervical dysplasia and
are classified as CIN grade 1 or 2. LSIL may regress, experience no change or progress to
high-grade squamous intraepithelial lesions (HSIL) [7]. HSIL represents severe cervical
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dysplasia and is classified as CIN grade 3 or carcinoma in situ (CIS). Women with HSIL
may also clear their infections partially or completely, but their infections are more likely
to persist and progress to SCC [7]. AC is caused by persistent infection in the glandular
cells and is preceded by adenocaricnoma in situ (AIS). The natural history of AC is not
well understood compared to SCC [10].
HPV is transmitted sexually, so risk of infection and developing cervical cancer are
related to sexual behaviour. Infection risk is influenced by age of first sexual activity,
number of lifetime partners, condom use and sexual encounters with high-risk individuals
[2,7,11,12]. Peak infection rate occurs in women under 25 years, and incident infections
are mostly transient among women of all ages [8]. Increasing parity, long-term oral
contraceptive use, smoking and infection with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) are
also associated with an elevated risk of cervical cancer [8].

1.2 Burden of Cervical Cancer
Cervical cancer accounts for 9% of new cases of cancer in women worldwide, making it
the third most commonly diagnosed cancer in women [13]. In 2008 there were an
estimated 529,000 incident cases of cervical cancer and 275,000 related deaths [13].
However developing countries are disproportionately affected and account for over 85%
of cervical cancer cases and deaths [14]. Incidence and mortality rates in developed
countries are a fraction of those in developing regions, which is predominantly due to a
lack of screening in low-resource countries [14]. The cumulative risk of developing
cervical cancer for a woman in the developing world is 1.9% [14], whereas a Canadian
woman has a 0.7% lifetime risk [15].
Each year about 91,400 Canadian women are diagnosed with cancer, and cervical cancer
accounts for 1.6% of all cases [15]. In 2013 there were an estimated 1,450 incident cases
and 380 deaths from cervical cancer, and each year an estimated 610 women are
diagnosed with and 150 die from cervical cancer in Ontario [15].
The five-year relative survival ratio for Canadian women is 72% [15]. Age at diagnosis is
an important prognostic factor, which may be related to later stage at diagnosis of older
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women who are less likely to be screened [16]. Peak excess mortality occurs in the first
year after diagnosis [17].

1.3 Cervical Cancer Screening
Cervical cancer screening is a method of secondary prevention that aims to reduce
cervical cancer risk by detecting and treating cervical lesions that may become malignant
[18]. Screening with the Papanicolaou (Pap) smear was first introduced in Canada in
1949, and widespread uptake of screening began in the 1970s [19]. Although the
effectiveness of Pap smears for preventing cervical cancer has never been studied in a
clinical trial, there is substantial epidemiological evidence to support its use for reducing
cervical cancer incidence and mortality [20-22]. Between 1972 and 2006, Canadian
incidence and mortality rates decreased by 58% and 71%, respectively [19]. The drastic
decline in rates is largely attributed to the successes of screening [19]. The slow
progression from HPV infection to dysplasia to invasive cancer may take years [23];
therefore regular screening and follow-up of abnormal results can prevent cancer by
detecting and treating precancerous lesions [19,21]. Pap smears can also detect
preclinical cancers at an earlier stage, which require less aggressive treatment and have
better survival.
Ontario guidelines recommend women who are or have ever been sexually active be
screened with a Pap test once every three years beginning at age 21 and ceasing at age 70
given adequate negative screen history [18,20]. The Ontario Cervical Screening Program
has sent letters to eligible women to invite them to screening, advise them of Pap test
results and remind them to return for screening since 2013. A woman’s primary care
physician usually performs Pap tests.
Screening participation has increased slightly since 2000, but is well below the provincial
target of 85%. The estimated three-year screening rates among women aged 20 to 69 in
2010 and 2011 were between 65% and 72% [24,25]. Some groups of women are less
likely to be screened than others. Screening participation decreases with age and women
living in low-income area are less likely to be screened than women from high-income
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areas [25]. Women with access to a primary care physician are more likely to be screened
than those without a regular provider [26,27].

1.4 Cervical Dysplasia and Cervical Cancer Care
Abnormal Pap smear results are not uncommon and about 5.5% of women screened in
2012 had an abnormal result [24]. Women with a test result of atypical squamous cells of
unknown significance (ASCUS) are recommended to undergo active surveillance with
repeat Pap testing every six months. Women with LSIL are often recommended active
surveillance, but some may receive immediate treatment. If a repeat Pap smear is
abnormal then women are referred to colposcopy for further investigation. After three
negative smears over a period of a year and a half, women may return to the normal
screening interval. Referral to colposcopy is also recommended for a primary test result
of HSIL, atypical squamous cells cannot exclude HSIL (ASC-H), atypical glandular cells
(AGC), CIS, AIS or other malignant neoplasms.
Colposcopy is a diagnostic procedure that magnifies the inside of the cervix and vagina
for inspection. A biopsy is usually taken concomitantly for a definitive diagnosis of CIN
or cancer. Women with CIN or CIS may be treated with loop electrosurgical excision
procedure (LEEP), laser excision, cone biopsy, cryosurgery or hysterectomy. If a biopsy
reveals malignant cells then the cancer is staged and graded before deciding on a
treatment course.
Primary treatment of early stage cancers is often surgical. A hysterectomy removes the
entire uterus and may be accompanied by removal of the pelvic or para-aortic lymph
nodes. A radical hysterectomy is when the uterus and surrounding parametrium are
removed and the pelvic lymph nodes are dissected. Younger women wishing to preserve
their fertility may receive a radical cervicectomy with or without lymph node dissection,
which removes the cervix while leaving the uterus in tact. Over half of Ontario cases
receive surgery for their cancer with younger women being most likely to have surgery
[28]. Older women, those with significant comorbidities, or advanced cases are
recommended primary treatment with radiation therapy with or without concurrent
cisplatin [28]. Concurrent radiation and cisplatin is also recommended for high-risk early
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stage cancers following hysterectomy [29]. Recurrent, metastatic or persistent cancers are
recommended treatment with cisplatin in combination with topotecan [30]. After
successful treatment, follow-up is recommended every three to four months in the first
two disease-free years and every six to 12 months between years three and five [31].
Women may return to annual assessment with their family physician after five years of
remission [31].

1.5 Interventions to Increase Cervical Cancer Screening
Women that are never screened or not screened during the recommended interval have
increased risks of cervical cancer, later stage at diagnosis and cervical cancer-related
mortality [32-33]. Despite the risks of non-compliance and widespread availability of
screening, many women do not participate. Effective interventions to increase screening
participation are necessary to reduce the risks of cervical cancer and future burden on the
healthcare system. Patient-directed interventions, such as tailored reminders and
education programs, have been shown to effectively increase cancer screening rates
[35,36]. However provider-directed interventions are also needed, as physician
recommendation to screen is a strong predictor of screening adherence [37]. Provider
reminders, audit and feedback, and recall systems are recommended to increase cervical,
breast and colorectal cancer screening rates [35,36,38]. Provider incentives are being
increasingly advocated to improve quality of health care services, including improved
cancer screening; however the existing findings are inconclusive and further research is
needed to assess their effectiveness [35,36,39-41].

1.6 Financial Incentives
Financial incentives are implicit or explicit rewards to encourage a physician to provide
high quality care and deliver cancer screening manoeuvres. Remuneration schemes are
implicit incentive contracts that link a principal (e.g. government health plan, private
insurer) to an agent (e.g. primary care physician) to provide targeted services. The
traditional funding model is a fee-for-service (FFS) system where a physician is paid for
each service provided to patients. One alternative to FFS is a capitation payment system,
in which a physician receives a fixed payment for each patient enrolled and is obliged to
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provide specific services to these patients. Explicit incentives directly reward physicians
for quality in specific areas of care. Explicit incentives include one-time bonuses, perpatient premiums or pay-for-performance (P4P) bonuses with stepped payments.
The effect of provider remuneration on preventive care delivery has not been widely
studied and is poorly understood (detailed literature review in the following section).
Some studies on P4P incentives report modest improvements in cervical cancer
screening, but the evidence is inconclusive [36,39-41]. Few studies have evaluated
implicit or explicit incentives in Canada, and it is difficult to draw conclusions from
evidence from other health care systems within the context of universal healthcare in
Canada.
To date there has been no economic analysis of financial incentives for cervical cancer
screening. As the popularity of alternative funding arrangement and P4P incentives grow
in Ontario and throughout Canada, it is imperative that the most cost-effective ways of
delivering care are chosen.

1.7 Literature Review
1.7.1

Primary Care

Primary care is the patient’s first point of contact with the health care system providing a
point of referral to specialists if needed [42]. A primary care physician may be a family
physician, general practitioner, general pediatrician or general internist [43]. The primary
care physician-patient relationship is long lasting and focused on overall patient health,
whereas the specialist-patient relationship may be shorter and more disease focused
[42,43]. Primary care physicians provide comprehensive care and their services range
from preventive to rehabilitative [42,43]. Providers address the majority of their patients’
health care needs and are usually the point of referral to specialists [42].
Strong primary care systems lead to better health outcomes and areas with more primary
care physicians are consistently associated with lower rates of all-cause and cancerrelated mortality and improved patient satisfaction [43]. Access to a primary care
physician increases the chances of receiving needed services and earlier diagnoses
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[44,45] and reduces the likelihood of emergency room visits and hospitalizations [46].
Women with regular family physicians are more likely to be screened for cervical (odds
ratio [OR]: 1.30, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.17 – 1.46) and breast cancer (OR: 1.38,
95% CI 1.16 – 1.64) [47]. Similarly, Ontario breast cancer patients living in areas with
greater supplies of general practitioners were significantly more likely to be diagnosed
with localized cancer, indicating higher mammography rates in areas with better access to
primary care [48]. Increased health promotion and screening rates of primary care
providers may lead to earlier cancer diagnoses and improved survival [49]. Indeed,
increased supply of family physicians is associated with decreased rates of cervical
cancer incidence and related mortality [50].

1.7.2

Primary Care Reform

The association between strong primary care systems and improved health outcomes
sparked interest in optimizing the organization, delivery and funding of primary care
models to deliver high-quality, cost-effective, equitable care [51]. Many developed
nations strengthened their primary care systems and access to care towards the end of the
20th century; however Canada, and particularly Ontario, lagged behind [52,53]. A survey
of primary care physicians from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom
and the United States reported that Canadian physicians were most concerned about
health care quality [54]. Canada had the highest proportions of physicians reporting that
their ability to provide quality care had deteriorated in the past five years (59%) and that
they were very concerned about increasing wait times (75%) [54]. In 1998 Canada had
the third lowest ratio of physician to population among eight developed nations [55] and
was the only country to have a negative growth rate of physicians per population [56].
Within Canada, Ontario’s primary care systems lagged behind the other provinces. The
absolute number of primary care physicians remained relatively constant during the
1990s, but population growth resulted in a decline in the number of physicians per
population [57,58]. By 2000 Ontario had the second lowest provincial ratio of family
physicians to population with only 85 physicians per 100,000 persons [57]. Limited
access to primary care in Ontario was due in part to higher specialist income,
maldistribution of physicians and preference for graduates to specialize [59,60].
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Primary care systems are often defined by their organizational structure, delivery
methods and remuneration model [61]. Historically, the primary care landscape in
Ontario was made up by privately owned and managed solo or small group practices of
family physicians and general practitioners [61]. Since the majority of primary care
providers were physicians, of whom less than 10% worked in multidisciplinary practices,
delivery of primary care had a strong physician focus [61]. While alternative payment
schemes existed, the vast majority of Canadian primary care physicians were reimbursed
on a fee-for-service (FFS) basis. In 1998 89% of Canadian family physicians received
some income from FFS payments, which accounted for an average 88% of their total
income [62]. About 20% of family physicians received a salary, which accounted for
56% of their total income [62]. Only 1.5 of FPs received capitation based payments,
which derived 72% of their total income [62].
Innovations to primary care in Canada have been introduced several times during the
20th century, but thus far failed to achieve true reform [52]. In the late 1970’s Health
Services Organizations (HSO) and Community Health Centres (CHC) were introduced to
Ontario as alternatives to conventional practices [61]. These organizations delivered PC
differently by incorporating nurses, nurse practitioners and other healthcare providers
[61]. While HSOs remained physician owned, CHCs are governed by a community
board. They also adopted alternative funding methods with HSOs being capitation based
and CHCs being salaried. Pilot primary care models, such as Primary Care Networks,
were launched in the mid-1990s in Ontario in the hopes of identifying innovative ways of
organizing, delivering and funding primary care [61]. Despite the calls for and attempts
of innovation and reform to Canadian primary care systems, little change was achieved
[62,62]. In the early 2000s the federal government established five national reform goals:
increased access to primary care services, increased emphasis on health promotion,
preventive health and chronic disease management, increasing all-day access to essential
services, increasing the number of primary care physicians working in interdisciplinary
teams, and integrating primary care with other healthcare services [52].
In response to the new national objectives, Ontario took steps to overhaul its primary care
system. New organizational and funding models were created to meet the diverse needs
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of providers and communities, promote inter-professional delivery of care, increase
patient access and improve efficiency [52]. Common elements of the new models include
group practices with shared responsibilities, provision of after-hours care, and patient
enrolment. Participation in the new models is voluntary, so financial incentives were
embedded in the new contract models. One of the biggest policy changes in the last wave
of reform was introducing new remuneration schemes and the shift away from FFS
payments.

1.7.3

Theoretical Background of Financial Incentives

Remuneration schemes link physicians to patients, insurers, or government health plans
through incentive contracts [64]. A health plan (the principal) gives incentives to
encourage quality physician (the agent) performance [64]. Incentives range from explicit
incentives like targeted bonuses for achieving performance standards to implicit
incentives like remuneration method. Physician behaviour is affected by their payment
method, which is designed to provide high agent rewards at low cost to the principal [64].
Economic theory of physician behavior posits that physicians want to maximize their
income while still providing acceptable patient care and will attempt to do so by altering
practice size, working hours, visit duration and time per patient [65]. However other
factors, such as intrinsic motivation to care for patients or desire for work-life balance,
may also affect practice patterns.
Physicians practicing in FFS systems receive a fee for each service provided. Since their
income is dependent on the volume of services provided, there is an incentive to provide
more services and treat high-use patients [65]. Economic theory suggests that FFS
systems align patient and physician interests: the patient seeks the best possible medical
service and physician seeks to maximize profits by providing more services [66]. In
practice best medical care differs between patients and some patients may not wish to
access the healthcare system at all. Quality of care is high in FFS practices according to
patient and physician satisfaction [67,68]. Neither physician nor patient has an incentive
to restrict health care utilization, which puts the principal at risk for increasing health care
expenditures [64,66].
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In capitation systems, physicians receive set payments for each patient to provide
treatment. Capitation schemes improve efficiency because there’s no incentive to provide
unnecessary services and many contracts stipulate that payments are reduced if patients
seek care outside of the practice. Capitation rates may be age, sex and/or risk adjusted,
but physicians still risk attracting less healthy patients. The amount necessary to provide
quality care for a patient may be more or less than actual capitation payments, which
shifts the financial risk from the principal to the agent [64,65]. The failure to motivate
quality care is an example of the principal-agent problem, and physicians may under
provide if gaps exist between physician financial interest and patient medical interests
[64,66]. If capitation rates are not risk-adjusted, physicians may seek to maximize income
by cream skimming, or enrolling many low-risk patients that will require little care [66].
While comprehensiveness of care may be impacted, capitation systems may achieve
better continuity of care because physicians have incentives to maintain long-lasting
relationships [66]. Capitation systems may encourage physicians to provide preventive
care services and health promotion to reduce future services needed by their patients [69].
A recent systematic review of the literature suggested that payment method affects
physician behaviour [69]. FFS physicians are more productive and treat sicker patients,
whereas capitation improves efficiency [64,69]. These findings are supported by evidence
from Ontario. FFS physicians conduct 29% more visits than their non-FFS counterparts
[70]. However there was no significant difference in total hours worked per week
between FFS and other remuneration schemes [71]. Physicians practicing in FHNs
provided slightly fewer services than those in FHGs, but continuity of care was similar in
both models [59]. Capitation-based practices in Ontario have wealthier patients with
fewer comorbidities than FFS based models, which is likely a result of capitation rates
not being adjusted for risk [60].
The problems of FFS and capitation systems may be addressed with blended payment
models, which combine fixed and variable payments [64,65]. In blended capitation
models, physicians receive their primary income from capitation payments to cover a
core basket of services for enrolled patients. Variable income is generated by full FFS
payments for all services provided to non-enrolled patients and non-core services
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provided to enrolled patients. These payments encourage broader scope of practice [64].
Some systems encourage enrolling sicker patients with fractional FFS payments for all
core services [64]. Pay-for-performance programs may also generate variable income.
Physicians practicing in Ontario’s FHNs and FHOs are primarily reimbursed by
capitation payments, but receive additional variable income for providing non-core
services, P4P incentives and other incentives. In such models, physicians are encouraged
to provide efficient services while maintaining a broad scope of practice and high quality
of care [64]. Ontario’s FHGs are an example of a blended FFS model: enhanced FFS
payments are combined with explicit incentives like preventive care bonuses,
comprehensive care fees and diabetes management incentives.
Bonuses are direct incentives that aim to change physician behaviour [72]. Pay-forperformance (P4P) schemes are explicit financial incentives to deliver services at high
quality levels. Various P4P schemes have been introduced worldwide based on the theory
that they are the most efficient way of achieving high-quality, equitable care [73].
Ontario’s Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus is typical of most P4P programs where
physicians receive additional payments for delivering specified levels of service.
Performance based payments aim to reduce variations in delivery of service and increase
productivity [73]. The rationale for P4P schemes is they may resolve the principal-agent
problem by aligning physician and patient interests [74]. If quality of care affects
financial success, then physicians will devote more time and resources to achieving such
levels of quality. High-performing physicians will be rewarded and low-performing
physicians will be motivated to improve performance; however bonuses may fail to affect
physician behaviour if there is no negative consequence for underperformance [72].

1.7.4

Ontario’s Reformed Primary Care Delivery Models

There are ten primary care enrolment models (PEM), but this discussion is limited to
three: Family Health Networks (FHN), Family Health Groups (FHG) and Family Health
Organizations (FHO). The remuneration schemes of the new models differ somewhat, but
have some common commitments and incentives. Practices must have a minimum of
three physicians and provide after-hours care. Formal enrolment of patients is strongly
encouraged; however patients are not required to enroll, and physicians cannot refuse a
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patient enrolment based on their health or service needs. Rostering a patient formalizes
the patient-physician relationship; patients commit to seek treatment from their
physician’s practice and physicians commit to providing comprehensive care. The
Unattached Patient Fee is a one-time incentive to enroll new patients. Physicians receive
a monthly comprehensive care fee for each rostered patient in addition to their primary
funding. Other incentives exist for seeing patients after hours, achieving targeted levels of
preventive care services and chronic disease management.
Two blended capitation models were introduced: the Family Health Network (FHN) in
2002 and Family Health Organization (FHO) in 2007. Physicians receive monthly ageand sex-adjusted capitation payments for each rostered patient to cover a basket of core
services. The FHO base rate payment is greater than the FHN rate, but the basket of core
services is much greater. In addition to capitation payments, physicians receive a
percentage of FFS payments for core services provided to rostered patients, and full FFS
payments for all services provided to non-enrolled patients and non-core services
provided to enrolled patients. Access Bonuses are additional payments and reduced dollar
for dollar when rostered patients seek core services outside the group practice.
In 2003 the blended FFS Family Health Group (FHG) was introduced. Physicians receive
full FFS payments and premiums for after-hours care and comprehensive fee codes. Like
physicians in capitation-based models, FHG physicians also receive monthly
comprehensive care fee for their rostered patients and targeted incentives.
A primary care team is not a funding model, but an interdisciplinary practice model.
Family Health Teams (FHTs) consist of professionals from different disciplines, such as
physicians, nurse practitioners, dieticians, pharmacists and social workers. In contrast, a
traditional practice usually consists of physicians, office assistants and occasionally
nurses. Primary care teams in Ontario were first established with CHCs in 1979 and then
expanded with FHTs in 2005. CHCs focus on hard-to-serve populations, whereas FHTs
offer patients access to different types of health care providers in one place. FHTs receive
a global budget from the MOHLTC, which funds everything except physician services
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and some clinical and support staff of FHT physicians. FHT physicians bring their own
funding through a FHN or FHO, but must meet all PEM and FHT requirements.
The MOHLTC introduced Cumulative Preventive Care Bonuses in 2006 to increase
delivery rates of preventive care services. Eligible PEM physicians may claim an annual
bonus for achieving targeted levels of preventive care services among their enrolled
patients in the following categories: influenza vaccinations, childhood immunizations,
colorectal cancer screening, mammography and Pap smears. The Pap smear bonus is
based on the percentage of a physician’s target population that have been screened for
cervical cancer in the 30 months prior to March 31st of the fiscal year when the bonus is
being claimed. The target population for cervical cancer screening includes all enrolled
female patients aged 35 to 69 years except women with history of hysterectomy or
screening for cervical diseases that preclude regular Pap smear testing. There are five
bonus levels corresponding to stepped achieved compliance rates. Physicians achieving
65% compliance receive a $220 bonus and those achieving 80% or higher receive $2,200.
The primary care landscape in Ontario has shifted greatly in the past ten years. The new
PEMs proved attractive, as the average payments per active physician in a PEM were
higher than FFS physicians [75]. In 2002, the majority (94%) of family physicians
practiced in traditional FFS models [52]. By 2012, only 24% practiced in FFS
arrangements and 76% of family physicians practiced in one of the new models [52].
FHGs were the most popular PEM until the end of 2010 when FHOs became the most
common PEM [75,76]. Delivery of primary care also shifted away from a physician
focus, with the number of physicians practicing in interdisciplinary primary health teams
growing from 176 to over 3,000 between 2000 and 2012 [62]. The majority (2,400) of
physicians joined one of the province’s 200 FHTs [62]. Patient enrolment increased from
only 600,000 enrolled patients province-wide in 2002 to 9.9 million, or 73% of the
provincial population, in 2012 [62].

1.7.5

Evidence on the Effectiveness of Financial Incentives

The impact of financial incentives on delivery of preventive care or effectiveness for
improving performance measures has not been clearly demonstrated. The literature is
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inconsistent and many studies are plagued with methodological issues. Few studies have
assessed the impact of incentives with randomized controlled trials (RCT), and the
majority of available evidence comes from weaker designs such as controlled before and
after studies (CBA) or observational studies. Design limitations limit the ability to assess
the impact on health outcomes, so instead process indicators or intermediate outcomes
are reported. A theme amongst the evidence is that studies with weaker designs report
greater effect sizes than those with stronger designs [76]. Comparing results form various
studies is not always appropriate because of differences in incentive type, health care
system or setting. Therefore the study context and its relevance to the Ontario health care
system is must be considered when reviewing the evidence [77,78].

1.7.5.1

Remuneration/Implicit Incentives

There is some evidence suggesting that primary payment method influences physician
visit patterns and service volume, but the effects on quality and comprehensiveness of
care remain a concern [69]. Physicians reimbursed with capitation payments provide
more efficient service than those in FFS practices, but observing and verifying quality of
care remains a challenge [69]. In theory, capitation systems deliver improved preventive
care but there is scarce empirical evidence to support this claim [65]. Evidence suggests
that alternative payment methods (capitation or salary) are associated with greater
provision of preventive care [79], but there is limited empirical evidence on the effect on
remuneration scheme on cancer screening.
A Scottish study evaluated the effect of a new reimbursement contract for Pap smears on
screening rates [80]. Physicians were formerly paid for each Pap performed, but the new
contract linked remuneration to meeting performance targets of 50% and 80% [80].
Within six months of introducing the new contract, screening coverage increased from
78% to 85% (p < 0.05) [80]. However the effect of temporal trend cannot be ruled out
since there was no comparison group.
Health maintenance organizations (HMO) and managed care plans in the US provide
some insight on delivery of preventive care in capitation-based models, but are not
generalizable to the Canadian system. Enrollees in HMOs are more likely to receive
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preventive care services [81,82]. Cervical screening rates are statistically higher among
patients of fully-capitated Medicaid managed care plans than those in the Medicaid FFS
program (71% versus 39%; p < 0.0001) [83]. Similarly, greater proportions of HMO
enrollees receive Pap smears and mammograms than patients enrolled in traditional
indemnity plans [84,85]. Increased coverage of screening and preventive services may
have contributed to earlier stage cancer diagnoses of Medicare HMO enrollees than FFS
enrollees [86]. Compared to non-enrollees, HMO members were less likely to be
diagnosed with regional or distant cervical cancer (OR: 0.34; 95% CI 0.21 – 0.56), distant
breast cancer (OR: 0.73; 95% CI 0.57 – 0.94), regional breast cancer (OR: 0.78; 95% CI
0.69 – 0.87) and regional colon cancer (OR: 0.85; 95% CI 0.75 – 0.96) [86]. American
evidence supports the theory that preventive care is more likely in capitation models,
however this different may reflect improved insurance coverage rather than quality
[81,82]. Therefore evidence from a mixed-payer system doesn’t necessarily reflect what
will occur under universal health care.
Evidence from Ontario suggests that capitation-based practices may deliver better
preventive care than FFS based practices. Dahrouge et al. (2012) [87] calculated
preventive care scores from chart audits of the following manoeuvres: cervical, breast
and colorectal cancer screening, influenza immunizations, and visual and auditory
impairment screening. After adjusting for physician and patient characteristics, FHN
practices had significant higher preventive care scores than FFS based (traditional FFS
and FHG) practices or established capitation (HSO) [87]. During the study period, only
FHN practices were eligible for preventive care bonuses, which may have biased the
effect of funding model [87]. However including practice organizational factors in the
model showed that practice characteristics were the primary determinants of preventive
care scores rather than funding model [87]. This study failed to meet sample size
requirements, which may explain the finding of no effect when including all independent
variables in the model [87]. The importance of organizational factors is supported on
delivery is supported by the findings of Thind et al. (2008) [88]. Preventive care scores
were significantly higher among practices participating in a PEM than those that weren’t
(OR: 1.58; p = 0.032) [88] Since both studies used prevention scores across several
measures, the effect on individual manoeuvres cannot be determined.
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In contrast, Jaakimainen et al. (2011) [89] examined delivery rates of individual
preventive services before and after joining a FHN or FHG. Participation in cervical
cancer screening increased by 1.9% (p < 0.001) after joining a FHG and 4.6% (p < 0.001)
after joining a FHN [89]. Among physicians joining a FHG, mammography rates
decreased by 3.3% (p < 0.001); however rates increased by 2.4% (p < 0.001) among
physicians that joined a FHN [89]. After joining a FHG and FHN, FOBT screening rates
increased by 3.2% (p < 0.001) and 7.4% (p < 0.001), respectively [89]. Overall cervical
and colorectal screening rates were not different between FHGs and FHNs; however
overall mammography rates were significantly higher among FHNs [79]. The authors
noted that statistically significant differences might not be meaningful at a population
health level because sample sizes were very large [89]. Secular trends for cancer
screening were already increasing, which may account for a significant portion of all of
the observed increases [89]. Without a traditional FFS comparison group or analysis from
multiple time points, observed uptake cannot be unequivocally attributed as a model
effect [89].
Kralj et al. (2013) [90] compared provider behaviour of physicians that switched from a
FHG to FHO with physicians remaining in FHGs to assess the effect of capitation.
Physicians that switched provided 6-7% fewer visits and services per day, but worked
similar hours [90]. Switching physicians were more likely to receive each type of
preventive care bonus and about 10% more likely to receive one for Pap smear coverage
[90]. This indirect measure suggests that joining a capitation is associated with improved
delivery [90]. These results suggest that capitation is more efficient without comprising
quality.

1.7.5.2

Explicit Incentives

The empirical evidence of the effectiveness of explicit financial incentives on physician
behaviour is also inconclusive. The effect of P4P incentives for all performance measures
has been estimated as a modest improvement of 5% [77]. Improvements have been
reported for process and intermediate clinical outcomes for chronic diseases, but the
evidence on cancer screening is less consistent. Two systematic reviews found
insufficient evidence to support the use provider incentives for increasing cancer
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screening [36,39]. However a more recent systematic review suggested Incentives could
have a modest effect and that more evidence was needed [78]. While some studies report
significant effects of P4P programs, the effect sizes are usually modest and
methodological quality issues often limit their interpretation. Similarly, it is often hard to
determine if findings of no effect are due to program or study design flaws.
There have been two RCTs that assessing the impact of bonuses or P4P programs on
cancer screening uptake and both found no effects [91,89]. Hillman et al. (1998) [91]
evaluated a tournament style bonus program to improve cancer screening referrals among
women in Medicaid managed care plans in the USA. Primary care sites randomized to
the intervention group were eligible to receive group bonuses worth up to 20% of plan
capitations [91]. During the 18-month study period referrals for breast, cervical and
colorectal cancer screening increased, but there were no significant between-group
differences [91]. Grady et al. (1997) [92] evaluated the effects of reminders, audit and
feedback, and incentives on mammography referral and compliance rates. American
family practices were randomized to the following groups: education (control), education
plus cue enhancement with chart stickers, and education plus cue enhancement plus
feedback and rewards (incentive) [92]. Physicians in the incentive group received a $50
bonus if they achieved a 50% referral rate [92]. During the one year study period, the
incentive group’s referral and compliance rates increased by 26% and 17.9%,
respectively [92]. Control referral and compliance rates were significantly lower than
both intervention groups, but since there were no differences between intervention group
rates, the effect was attributed to the reminder intervention [92]. Both trials had short
study periods and small sample sizes, which may have influenced the finding of no effect.
The designs of these P4P programs have been criticized as having insufficiently sized
bonuses to be effective and poor program awareness among physicians [41]. Therefore
the finding of no effect may be due to weak study design, a poorly planned incentive
program or a combination of both.
There are many pay-for-performance programs implemented by various health insurance
plans in the USA. Results from different programs are mixed and difficult to compare
due to program, plan and population differences. Lack of standardization across different
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programs places an administrative burden on providers eligible for bonuses that may not
be worth the payout [93]. The results of programs run by PacifiCare, the Integrated
Health Association (IHA) of California, Physician Quality and Service Recognition
(PQSR) program and Blue Cross Blue Shield Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) are
discussed below.
Medical groups in California were exposed to two P4P contracts over the past decade:
PacifiCare’s Quality Improvement Program (QIP) and the IHA’s P4P contract. Both
programs have been evaluated using a CBA design using a comparison group of medical
groups in the Pacific Northwest contracted to the same health plans that were unexposed
to incentives [94,95]. The QIP, launched in July 2003, enabled physicians to receive
quarterly bonuses of $0.625 per plan member for meeting or exceeding clinical targets in
the following areas: cervical cancer screening, mammography, HbA1c testing among
diabetics and two other measures [94]. In the program’s second year, a second
performance tier worth twice as much was added. In July 2004, the IHA bonus program
began and the same medical groups could receive bonuses for performance in the same
performance areas as the QIP for members of five other health plans [95]. Incentives
varied slightly between different health plans, but performance scores were based on
clinical quality measures, patient experience and adopting IT to support care (Pink 2006).
The IHA greatly expanded the bonus potential for physicians by about ten times for the
average medical group [95]. Rosenthal et al. (2005) [94] reported the results of
PacifiCare’s QIP program, and Mullen et al. (2010) [95] reported findings from the IHA
scheme. During the QIP’s first year, Pap smear and mammography rates increased by
5.3% (p < 0.001) and 1.9% (p < 0.04), respectively [94]. Compared to controls, Pap
smear rates increased by 3.6 percentage points more (p < 0.02), but there was no
significant difference in mammography rates [94]. Low performing physicians had the
greatest response to the incentive program, increasing screening rates by 11.1% [95].
However about 75% of payments went to physicians already achieving target levels
raising the question that targets were set too low to achieve a meaningful increase [56].
The effect of QIP may be biased due to physician exposure to the IHA [51,56,57].
Medical groups were aware that the IHA would begin the following year and anticipatory
effects may overestimate the QIP effect [39,95]. Indeed Mullen et al. (2010) [95]
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reported no significant effects on performance in the period when physicians were only
exposed to the QIP. In the first year of the IHA, an increase in Pap smear rates of 3.5
percentage points more than controls suggests that the findings of Rosenthal et al. (2005)
[94] reflect the IHA effect [95]. The results of both studies show the importance of
incentive size.
The PQSR program in Hawaii is a voluntary P4P program for generalists and specialists
with Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) contracts. Bonuses are awarded by rankings
of composite score of all program components [96]. Participating physicians received
between 1 and 5% of their base professional fees in 1998-2001 and up to 7.5% from 2002
onwards [96]. In 2001, an additional bonus was added for significant performance
improvement [96]. Chen et al. (2010) [97] analyzed rates of cervical, breast and
colorectal screening of physicians in the first four years after joining the program.
Physicians with PPO contracts and without P4P incentives from outside Hawaii were
used as a comparison group [97]. The increase in cervical screening between program
years one and two was 6.6 percentage points greater for P4P physicians than the
comparison group (p < 0.001) [97]. The difference-in-difference was 1.4 percentage
points (p < 0.001) between years two and three, which suggests P4P is more effective
during its first year [97]. However the impact on colorectal rates were delayed. The rate
of increase in the P4P group was significantly lower than that of the control group until
the last year of the program when this finding was reversed [97]. The program had little
effect on mammography rates, which changed by less than 1% per year [97]. The greater
improvements were observed in low performing physicians, who increased Pap smear
rates by 13.6%, 0.5% and 7.4% each year [97]. Results from the PQSR must be
interpreted with caution for several reasons. Data from before the program started was
not available to assess the effect of temporal trends [96]. Risk of selection bias is high in
voluntary programs and cannot be ruled out without pre-program rates. Gilmore et al.
(2007) [96] tried to account for selection bias by comparing the previous year’s
performance rates for physicians that joined after program year one with those that did
not join in a given year. Physicians that joined in 1999 had significantly higher
performance in 1998 for cervical (p = 0.03), colorectal (p = 0.03) and breast cancer
screening (p = 0.003) than physicians that did not join [96]. When interpreting the results
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of Chen et al. (2010) [96], it’s important to consider the limitations of using comparison
data that differs by year and region. It’s possible that the P4P and control groups
experienced different regional and secular trends that weren’t controlled for. Considering
the limitations of the comparison and that no pre-program trends were reported, it’s
unclear if increased screening rates were a result of the program or existing trends.
The Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts is a
modified global payment model where physician groups and hospitals are at full or
partial risk for spending beyond negotiated budgets [98]. Annual payments to groups are
linked to per member per month budgets, which cover all services to plan enrollees
regardless of where they receive their care [98]. Groups under budget keep some or all of
the surpluses, while those over budget are responsible for some or all deficits [98].
Participating groups are eligible for quality incentive payments worth up to 5% of total
per member per month payments for performance on 32 ambulatory care measures and
services [98]. Screening rates increased for breast, cervical and colorectal cancer after
program implementation [99]. Compared to physician groups that did not enter the
contract, there was significant improvement for breast cancer screening in program years
one and two, but the effects were modest [99,100]. There was no significant effect on
cervical or colorectal cancer screening compared to the control group over the first two
years [100].
Significant improvements in colorectal screening rates are reported after initiating an
annual bonus program for private insurance plan members [101]. The bonus formula is
proprietary, so no details on bonus eligibility, method of calculation or incentive
magnitude were provided. Since Armour et al. (2004) [101] were unable to determine
which physicians were eligible, only those receiving bonuses were included in the
analysis. After program year one, fecal occult blood testing (FOBT) increased by 2.8% (p
< 0.01) and overall colorectal screening increased by 3% (p < 0.01) [101]. Since there
was no control group, the temporal effect of change cannot be clearly distinguished from
that of the bonuses [101].
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Gavagan et al. (2010) [102] compared screening rates of six community health centres
participating using financial incentives with those at five centres without bonuses. If a
clinic met two of three quality indicator targets then all clinic physicians received a bonus
[102]. The maximum bonus was $4,000 per year, representing 3 – 4% of a physician’s
salary [102]. Mammography and cervical cancer rates increased over the four-year study
period, but there were no significant differences between clinics with incentives and
without [102]. Significantly higher proportions of non-incentivized clinics met Pap smear
targets early in the study period, but this trend was reversed during the later quarters of
the study period [102]. These results suggest the incentive effect may be delayed, but
overall there were no significant differences in performance rates of Pap smears or
mammography between incentivized and non-incentivized clinics [102]. Features of the
incentive program may have caused finding of no effect. Group incentive programs are
unlikely to be as effective as incentives for individual physicians, and individual
physician productivity bonuses may have been more of an incentive [102]. Participating
physicians reported that bonuses were the least effective quality improvement
intervention, which may be due to insufficient incentive size [102]. Physicians were
aware of the program, but not told which indicators were incentivized to avoid selective
performance improvements [102]. About 50% of physicians were unable to correctly
identify the incentivized indicators, so lack of program knowledge may have contributed
to findings of no effect [102]. The study period was only 18 months, but practices may
take longer to adjust to the program. In addition to program limitations, this study’s small
sample size meant it was only powered to detect a very large effect size [102].
A Dutch P4P program designed by primary care providers led to quality improvements
for some clinical indicators, but not for Pap smears [103]. Physician groups were
awarded bonuses for performance in three quality areas: clinical care indicators, patient
management and patient experience Improvement [103]. The study timeframe was only
one year, but the cervical screening interval is usually three years. A year may have been
too short to cause an effect. The greatest improvements were reported for low-performing
indicators, so the baseline rate may have been too high to cause much of an effect [103].
Since group bonuses were awarded based on performance scores in over 30 clinical
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indicators, it’s possible that the bonus size was too small to cause an effect in many
indicators.
An Australian P4P program with per patient bonuses for under screened women and
those screened over target reported short-term increases in cervical cancer screening for
all physicians [104]. There was no significant association between increased screening
rates and participating in the program or claiming bonuses, which suggests that screening
rates were already increasing [104]. There is high risk of selection bias in this study as
participation in the program was voluntary; already high-performing physicians may have
chosen to join the program [104]. Participating physicians reported that the program
didn’t modify their practice and the burden of tracking and billing incentive codes was
greater than the amount of the bonus [104].
Interestingly one study found removing targeted incentives was more impactful on Pap
smear coverage than introducing them [105]. Screening only increased by 0.6% during
the two years it was incentivized and decreased by 1.6% yearly over the next five years
when incentives were removed [105]. Rates then began to increase when incentives were
reintroduced [105].
The few preliminary before and after studies assessing the impact of preventive care
bonuses on rates of targeted services in Ontario have reported modest effects. Li et al.
(2014) [106] used a difference-in-difference approach to control for selection bias to
compare rates of preventive care services between physicians eligible for bonuses and
FFS physicians. Preventive care bonuses increased Pap smear and colorectal cancer
screening rates by 3.1% and 9.5%, respectively [106]. There was no significant difference
in mammography rates [106]. Bonuses increased absolute levels of compliance by 4.1%
(p < 0.01), 1.8% (p < 0.01) and 8.5% (p < 0.01) for Pap smears, mammography and
colorectal cancer screening, respectively [106]. Compared to baseline compliance, Pap
smear, mammography and colorectal cancer screening rates increased by 7%, 2.8% and
57%, respectively [106]. The parallel trend test failed to reject the null hypothesis of a
common trend between physicians eligible for P4P and non-P4P physicians for Pap
smears, but the null hypothesis was rejected for mammography and colorectal cancer
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screening [106]. However results from the differential trend model are not qualitatively
different from the fixed-effects model [106]. Subgroup analyses revealed greater
responses among physicians with lower baseline compliance [106], which is consistent
with the findings of Chen et al. (2010) [96] and Rosenthal et al. (2005) [94]. The
incentive effect also varied with physician age and practice size with younger physicians
and larger practices having a greater response [106].
The Provider and Patient Reminders in Ontario: Multi-Strategy Prevention Tools (PPROMPT) project found similar modest results [107]. After one year of the project, timeappropriate delivery of Pap smears and mammography increased by 6.26% (95% CI 5.12
– 7.45) and 5.3% (95% CI 4.2 – 6.4), respectively [107]. The proportion of practices with
Pap smear coverage less than 60% decreased from 25% to 14%, and the proportion at the
highest performance level (<80%) increased from 31.5% to 55.6% [107]. Nurse
practitioners were deployed to some clinics, but comparable rates were observed for
clinics with and without nurse practitioners [107]. There are several limitations of that
limit the findings of Kaczorowki et al. (2013) [107]. The P-PROMPT project evaluated a
complex intervention including patient and provider reminders, deployment of nurse
practitioners and P4P bonuses, so the effect of incentives cannot be distinguished from
the co-interventions [107]. Furthermore, physicians survey responses indicate that other
aspects of the project, like reminder letters, were more useful for improving compliance
[108]. There was no contemporaneous control group, so improvements may be due in
part or whole to temporal trends.

1.7.6

Cost-Effectiveness

The cost-effectiveness of financial incentives for improving cancer screening has not
been investigated to date. A few economic analyses have evaluated pay-for-performance
programs and implicit financial incentives for improving other process of care outcomes
or intermediate outcomes. However few full economic analyses exist, and the incentives
and outcomes of these studies are not relevant to this analysis.
Bonus programs are often not cost-effective because previously high-performing
physicians must also be rewarded to cause change among those not meeting performance
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targets [72]. Depending on baseline performance and the structure of the P4P program,
the physicians previously meeting targets may receive the majority of bonus payments. It
is argued that explicit incentives are unsustainable since they add new costs to the
healthcare system when costs are already increasing [72]. However if expected savings
resulting from bonus-induced performance improvements are used to fund reward
payments then the program may be cost-effective.
Cancer screening was one of the first interventions to have a systematic costeffectiveness analysis [109] and over the past 40 years studies of the cost-effectiveness of
cervical cancer screening continue to be published. The reductions of the incidence and
mortality of cervical cancer after introducing Pap smears clearly demonstrated the
effectiveness of screening. However it was not clear at what ages women should be
screened or the interval length between screens. Cost-effectiveness analyses of screening
details have informed development of screening guidelines and programs [109]. With the
advent of new technologies such as liquid-based cytology and HPV DNA testing, recent
analyses have focused on the most cost-effective test. To date no there have been no costeffectiveness analyses of physician payment method or bonuses on cancer screening.
Early economic analyses reported that screening programs increase total cervical cancerrelated costs, but also improve health effects like life-years gained [110]. Despite lower
terminal treatment costs, the increases in diagnostic costs leads to greater total costs
[110]. Factors like screening ages, interval and attendance rates all influence the costeffectiveness of a screening program [111]. Identical programs with higher attendance
rates result in greater health effects and total costs, but costs increase less than
proportional to that of attendance [111]. Therefore programs with higher screening rates
are more cost-effective than those with lower attendance [111,112].
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1.8 Research Objectives
I aim to contribute to the growing body of evidence on financial incentives for improving
cancer screening performance. Three research objectives are:
1. Assess the difference in cervical cancer screening rates across three of Ontario’s
primary care delivery models:
a. Compare the traditional FFS model with the Family Health Group (FHG),
which is an enhanced FFS model eligible for P4P incentives.
b. Compare the traditional FFS model with the FHO, which is a capitation
model eligible for P4P incentives.
c. Compare the FHG and FHO models, which are both eligible for P4P
incentives, but have different base remuneration schemes.
2. Estimate the overall and specific healthcare costs associated with cervical cancer
treatment in Ontario during the first three years after diagnosis.
3. Conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis of remuneration and P4P eligibility for
cervical cancer screening in Ontario’s primary care delivery models.
Screening rates of Ontario FFS, FHG and FHO physicians were assessed from
population-based administrative databases held at the Institute for Clinical Evaluative
Sciences (ICES). Physician practice screening rates from 2010/2011 were adjusted for
patient and physician characteristics and compared across models. Costs were assessed
using ICES administrative data holdings for a cohort of Ontario cervical cancer cases
diagnosed between 2007 and 2010. Costs were estimated for the first three years
following cervical cancer diagnosis and adjusted for censoring. A microsimulation model
was developed from published natural history models and parameterized to Canada HPV
prevalence and cervical cancer incidence rates. This model was populated using
screening rates assessed in objective 1 and costs assessed in objective 2.
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Chapter 2

2

Financial Incentives and Cervical Cancer Screening
Participation in Ontario’s Primary Care Delivery Models

2.1 Introduction
Cervical cancer is the third most commonly diagnosed cancer in women worldwide and
1

ranks 11th in Canada [1-3]. Following the introduction of universal health insurance in
Canada in the early 1970s, uptake of cervical cancer screening with the Papanicolaou
(Pap) test increased considerably [3]. Between 1972 and 2006 cervical cancer incidence
and mortality rates declined by 58% and 71% and these reductions are largely attributed
to higher screening participation [3]. It takes several years for infection with human
papillomavirus (HPV) to progress to invasive cervical cancer, so with timely screening
and follow-up of abnormal test results, many cancer cases and deaths are preventable [5].
Despite the progress in cervical cancer screening, it was estimated that 610 women were
diagnosed with and 150 women died from cervical cancer in Ontario in 2013 [4]. Among
incident cases in Ontario, nearly 40% had no record of screening within the four years
prior to diagnosis [6].
Ontario guidelines recommend that women who are or ever have been sexually active
between 21 and 69 years be screened with a Pap smear every three years [7-9]. In 20092011 only 65% of women aged 20-69 were screened, which is well below the provincial
target rate of 85% [8]. Women who are never or inadequately screened have increased
risks of cervical cancer, advanced cancer and cervical cancer-related mortality [10-12].
Thus, failure to screen at the recommended interval presents a serious health challenge
for women and costs the health care system significantly. Primary care physicians, thus,
play an instrumental role in educating patients on the risks of cervical cancer and benefits
of screening with Pap tests.

1

The 2008 global cervical cancer age-standardized incidence rate (ASIR) and age-standardized mortality
rate (ASMR) were 15.2 and 7.8 per 100,000 women, respectively [1]. The 2013 Canadian ASIR and
ASMR were 7 and 1.6 per 100,000 women, respectively [4].
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In an effort to improve delivery of preventive health care services by primary care
physicians, the government of Ontario introduced primary care reforms in the early
2000s. Financial incentives for physicians and the mode of physician remuneration were
two mechanisms by which the government of Ontario aimed to improve the delivery and
uptake of a basket of preventive care services. After a transition period when physicians
quit the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) model, the Family Health Group (FHG) and the
Family Health Organization (FHO) models emerged as Ontario’s dominant primary care
delivery models [13-15]. A detailed comparison of model differences is described in
Appendix A2.1. In brief, the FHG is an enhanced FFS model where physicians submit
billing claims as in the traditional FFS model. The FHO is a blended capitation model
that reimburses physicians with age- and sex-adjusted capitation payments to provide a
set of services. FHO physicians are incentivized to submit shadow billings -- they receive
15% of the FFS payment for each core service submitted. In addition to base
remuneration, FHG and FHO physicians receive several incentives that are not available
to physicians practicing in the traditional FFS model [16].
A key incentive eligible to physicians practicing in FHGs or FHOs is the Pap smear
Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus. This pay-for-performance (P4P) program rewards
physicians each year with stepped payments based on the proportion of their enrolled
patients aged 35 to 69 years who received a Pap smear in the 30 months prior to March
31st of that fiscal year. Women who have had hysterectomies are excluded from the target
population. Physicians that have 60% of their patients screened receive a $220 bonus, and
physicians achieving the highest performance level (80%) receive $2,200. Table 2.1
summarizes the payments for each target coverage level.
Despite the increasing popularity of incentive-based payments to physicians to achieve
desirable health outcomes worldwide, the effectiveness of incentives is ambiguous [1719]. Some studies have found that financial incentives are associated with a modest
(<10%) improvement in cervical cancer screening rates, while others have found no
effects [20,21]. The evidence on the effect of remuneration is quite limited. Some studies
suggest that capitation-based practices deliver better preventive care compared to FFS
counterparts [22], but the effects of blended payment models are unclear to date [13].
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The objectives of this study are to compare cervical cancer screening rates in three of
Ontario’s primary care delivery models by incentive eligibility and remuneration. I
compared the traditional FFS model with the FHG, an enhanced FFS model where
physicians receive incentives if they meet target participation levels. I also compared the
FFS model with the FHO, where physicians are paid on a capitation basis and may
receive other incentives. Finally I compared the FHG and FHO models, both of which are
eligible for incentives, but have different base remuneration. Secondary objectives
include estimating the direct medical care costs of screening across the three primary care
delivery models: FFS, FHG and FHO.

2.2 Methods
2.2.1

Data Sources

The data for this study came from population-based Ontario health administrative
databases held at the Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences (ICES). These datasets
were linked using unique, encoded identifiers and analyzed at ICES. A cross-sectional
analysis of a population-based cohort was conducted. The Corporate Provider Database
(CPDB) contains information on physicians practicing in Ontario and program eligibility.
The ICES Physician Database (IPDB) contains physician demographic characteristics.
The Registered Persons Database (RPDB) holds demographic information on all Ontario
residents eligible for the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP). The OHIP claims
database contains all billing claims and shadow billing claims made by all Ontario
physicians. The Client Agency Program Enrolment (CAPE) tables were used to identify
patients rostered to physicians practicing in a FHG or FHO. Patients of physicians
practicing in a FFS practice were identified from OHIP claims using a validated ICES
2

algorithm [23]. Statistics Canada’s Postal Code Conversion File [24] was used to assign

2

The practice populations of FFS physicians are defined by claims submitted for primary care visits. All
patients that the physician billed OHIP for at least one visit in the previous fiscal year and any additional
patients with at least one visit in each of the two previous fiscal are assigned to that physician. If patients
meet these criteria for more than one physician, they are assigned to the physician with the most claims in
the most recent year. If the numbers of claims are equal across physicians then the patient is assigned to the
physician with the most recent visit.
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patients to census dissemination areas (DAs), which were then linked to the Ontario
Marginalization Index (OMI) and the Rurality Index of Ontario (RIO) [25]. The OMI
captures neighbourhood socio-economic factors across four dimensions: material
deprivation, residential instability, dependency and ethnic concentration [26]. Each
dimension is a composite of several indicators from the 2006 census (Appendix A2.2),
and data from each dimension is organized into quintiles where 1 is least marginalized
3

and 5 is most marginalized. Individuals with a RIO of 40 or higher were considered to
reside in rural areas [25].

2.2.2

Study Physicians and Study Patients

All full-time comprehensive primary care physicians (PCPs) practicing in a FHG, FHO
or traditional FFS model on March 31st, 2011 were included [27]. This date was chosen
to be consistent with the date used to calculate bonus payments and capture the most
recent data available. Ontario women aged 35 to 69 years inclusive on the index date that
were patients of FFS physicians or enrolled to FHG or FHO physicians were first selected
4

for inclusion. Women were excluded from the study population if there was evidence of
previous gynaecological cancer diagnoses in the Ontario Cancer Registry (OCR). The
OCR is a population-based registry that captures information on all Ontarians with
incident cancer cases except non-melanoma skin cancer. The Canadian Institute for
Health Information Discharge Abstract Database (CIHI-DAD) holds information on all
inpatient hospitalizations and was used to exclude women with evidence of hysterectomy.
Women with evidence of infection with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in the
ICES HIV database [28] were also excluded because they have increased risk of cervical
cancer and are precluded from regular screening [29].

3

Areas in quintile 1 are the least deprived, least unstable with respect to housing, least dependent and have
low ethnic concentrations. Quintiles 1 and 2 represent areas with the highest socioeconomic status and
socioeconomic status decreases with increasing quintile. Areas in quintile 5 are the most deprived, unstable
and dependent, and have the highest ethnic concentrations.
4

Note that women aged 21 to 34 years are eligible for screening, but were not part of the target population
for the cumulative preventive care bonus.
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Patient and physician-level characteristics were obtained on the index date (March 31st,
2011). Patient characteristics included age, rural residence and OMI quintiles. Physician
characteristics included age, gender, experience (defined as years since graduation),
international medical graduate (IMG) status and number of patients in the Pap smear
bonus target population.
Patient-level screening status was assessed from the OHIP claims database using a
5

validated billing code algorithm [30]. A woman was considered adequately screened if
at least one OHIP claim with a Pap smear billing code was made in the 30 months prior
to March 31st, 2011, as specified by the Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus guidelines.
The screening rate was defined as the number of eligible women receiving a Pap smear
divided by all eligible women in the corresponding physician’s practice.
Cumulative Preventive Care Bonuses claimed for Pap smears were identified from OHIP
claims. Physicians are responsible for calculating their coverage level and submitting
bonus claims to OHIP. The Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care sends each eligible
physician a Target Population Service Report, which defines the target population for
each bonus category. For Pap smears this includes all enrolled women aged 35 to 69
inclusive on March 31st of a given year. Women who have had a hysterectomy are
excluded. The Target Population Service Report, clinical records and other data sources
are used to identify which women were screened in the coverage period, and the coverage
level is calculated by dividing the number of women covered by the target population.
Documentation of services provided is not required for submission.

2.2.3

Analyses

Bivariate analyses using ANOVA and the Chi-square statistic where appropriate were
used to compare patient- and physician-level characteristics across model types and to
assess the associations between these characteristics and screening rates. The associations

5

Patients with at least one procedure, lab or applicable visit code billed to OHIP were considered
adequately screened.

40

between physician-level factors and claiming a bonus among FHG and FHO physicians
were also assessed using ANOVA and the Chi-square statistic.
Physician practice-level screening rate was the primary outcome of this study. Patientand physician-level covariates that were available from administrative databases were
included. However dependency and physician age were excluded because they were
highly correlated with material deprivation and physician experience, respectively.
Patient-level characteristics were aggregated to the physician’s practice. Mean patient age
and the proportion of a physician’s practice living in rural areas were calculated.
Socioeconomic status and ethnicity were estimated by calculating the proportion practice
patients living in quintiles 1 and 2 (least marginalized) in the following dimensions:
material deprivation, residential instability and ethnic concentration. The influence of the
Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus was assessed by comparing screening rates of FFS
with FHG physicians. In these two models physicians receive FFS payments, but only
FHG physicians are eligible for bonuses. The influence of remuneration (capitation
versus FFS) was assessed by comparing screening rates of FHG and FHO physicians.
Finally, performance of FFS physicians was compared to FHO physicians to assess the
overall impact of incentives and remuneration on screening rates and costs.
Since the outcome variable, screening rate in physician’s practice, is bounded between
zero and one the fractional logit regression model was considered [31]. I used a
generalized linear model with a binomial distribution and logit link function, so predicted
screening rates of 0% and 100% were attainable. Three fractional logit models were fit to
compare different pairs of primary care delivery models: 1) FFS with FHG 2) FHO with
FHG and 3) FFS with FHO. The dependent variable was physician-level screening rate
and the exposure variables of interest are the primary care delivery models. Patient-level
variables, physician gender, physician experience and number of patients in the Pap
smear target population were controlled (Box 2.1). Each regression model was fit using
data from physicians practicing in one of the two models being compared (i.e. regression
model 1 comparing FFS with FHG was fit using data from FFS and FHG physicians).
Marginal effects were obtained using the method of recycled predictions where predicted
screening rates are generated after fixing the values of primary care program model (e.g.
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in regression model 1 fix program to 0 for FFS to generate predictions and then fix
program to 1 for FHG to generate predictions) [32]. The predictions are then averaged to
estimate the conditional mean of a particular primary care model [32]. Regression
analyses were performed for the cohort and sensitivity analyses was conducted with
physicians with at least 100 eligible patients.
The costs of cervical cancer screening in Ontario were estimated in two steps: 1)
estimating delivery costs; and 2) estimating bonus costs for FHG and FHO physicians.
First, the service cost, exclusive of bonus payments, for Pap smear delivery was obtained
from Ontario’s schedule of fees and benefits [33]. Both the procedure fee ($6.75) and
laboratory fee ($11.55) were included in delivery costs [33]. It was assumed that all Pap
smears were performed outside of hospital and thus eligible for the laboratory fee.
Procedure codes are not eligible for payment when billed in conjunction with a
consultation, but it was assumed that the unit cost of all Pap smears would equal the rate
listed in the provincial fee schedule ($18.30). Pap smears are included of the basket of
services covered by base capitation payments in the FHO model, so FHO physicians
don’t receive the same fee as FFS or FHG physicians. However FHO physicians receive
the laboratory fee if performed outside of hospital and it was also assumed that the Pap
smear procedure fee is built into capitation payments. Therefore the unit cost of $18.30
was assigned to the FHO and delivery costs, excluding bonus payments, were the same
across all models. I assumed that the number of women screened over the study period
was distributed evenly. Thus, the number of women screened each year was estimated by
dividing the total screened by three (the number of years of coverage). Annual Pap smear
delivery costs were estimated by multiplying the number screened annually by the unit
cost. The second step in estimating the costs of screening was to estimate the overall and
per woman cost of bonuses paid to physicians. In the FHG and FHO models, the bonus
payments claimed by physicians in 2010/2011 were summed to obtain total bonus
payments, which were added to delivery costs to estimate the total costs of screening in a
given year. The cost per screen was estimated by dividing the total annual cost by the
annual number screened.
All analyses were performed using SAS 9.2 at ICES Western.
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2.3 Results
There were 7,382 full-time comprehensive primary care physicians practicing in a FFS,
FHG or FHO model on March 31st, 2011. Fifty-eight physicians did not have any
patients that met eligibility criteria and were excluded from further analyses. Twenty-six
physicians listed as FFS physicians claimed a bonus in 2011. Since FFS physicians
cannot claims bonuses, their primary care delivery model could not be accurately
identified and they were also excluded. The remaining 7,298 physicians had a total of
2,083,633 female patients aged 35-69 eligible for cervical cancer screening. Tables 2.2
and 2.3 summarize the characteristics of patients and physicians across model type.
Overall 80% of women had at least one Pap smear between 2009 and 2011. Seventythree per cent of FFS patients, 79% of FHO patients and 84% of FHG patients were
screened at least once Bivariate analysis suggested that each patient- and physician-level
characteristic was associated with patient-level screen status (Appendix A2.3). The mean
screening rate per physician was 79% across all three models; 72% among FFS
physicians, 79% among FHO physicians and 83% among FHG physicians (Figure 2.1a).
Primary care model type remained a statistically significant predictor of screening rate
after adjusting for patient- and physician-level characteristics (Appendix A2.4).
Screening rates of FHG physicians were 7.7% higher (p < 0.0001) than those of FFS
physicians (Table 2.4; Figure 2.1b). Compared to FHO physicians, rates of FHGs were
2.3% higher (p < 0.0001; Figure 2.1c). Adjusted performance of FHO physicians was
6.2% higher than that of FFS physicians (p < 0.0001; Figure 2.1d). Results from
sensitivity analyses of physicians with at least 100 eligible patients were similar to those
from the whole cohort.
Fifty-six per cent of FHG and 81% of FHO physicians claimed a Cumulative Preventive
Care Bonus for Pap smear delivery in 2010/11 (Table 2.5). Sixty-five per cent of
physicians claiming a bonus claimed the highest award level. There were significant
associations between claiming a bonus and all physician characteristics (Appendix A2.5).
In total $7.195 million in bonuses were paid to family physicians in FHGs and FHOs in
the 2010/11 fiscal year.
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The total one-year costs of cervical cancer screening ranged from $965,764 in the FFS
model to $9,498,350 in the FHO model. The FFS model has the lowest cost per woman
screened (the unit cost of $18.30) and adjusted screening rate (Table 2.6; Figure 2.2). The
costs per woman screened, including bonus payments, in the FHG and FHO models were
$29.71 and $35.02, respectively.

2.4 Discussion
In 2000-2002 cervical cancer screening participation among eligible Ontario women aged
20-69 was 61.6% [9]. Reforms to Ontario’s primary care system began in 2002, leading
to a transition period when physicians were joining the new patient enrolled models,
which stabilized around 2010 [13,14]. Previous research showed that in the first two
years after joining a FHG, the cervical screening rate increased by 1.9% (p < 0.001),
while among physicians joining the blended capitation Family Health Network (FHN)
model the screening rate increased by 4.6% (p < 0.001) [33]. The provincial screening
rate among women aged 20-69 steadily increased by 2.4% (p < 0.0001) since 2002 and
by 2008-2010 had improved to 72% [35].
My results show significant differences in cervical cancer screening rates between FFS
and two dominant reformed models in Ontario. These findings suggest that physician
payment method and incentives may affect Pap smear delivery. Screening rates were
significantly higher among FHO physicians, who receive FFS payments and are eligible
for incentives, compared to FFS physicians, suggesting that financial incentives
combined with a FFS payment scheme would achieve higher cervical screening rates.
The theoretical effect of remuneration on preventive services is unclear. FFS physicians
have an incentive to provide a high volume of services, which could include cervical
screening [36,37]. Physicians in capitation systems may have an incentive to reduce
services because they do not receive reimbursement for additional services [36,37].
However physicians paid under capitation may also try to reduce future care needed by
their patients and minimize financial risk by providing preventive care and health
promotion activities [38-40]. My results show that physicians in a blended capitation
system have significantly higher cervical screening participation than those in the FFS
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model. Blended systems like the FHO attempt to combine incentives from FFS and bonus
payments for providing higher quality care [38-40].
My results are generally consistent with past research suggesting that P4P incentives have
modest effects on cervical cancer screening rates [41]. Compared to the FFS model,
FHGs and FHOs have 7.7% and 6.2% higher screening rates. A previous analysis of
financial incentives in Ontario estimated that the bonus increased Pap smear delivery by
7% [25]. Another Ontario study found no difference in screening trends before and after
the introduction of the incentive [42]. In addition, patients who enrolled in a FHG or
FHO were more likely to receive cancer screening before incentives were introduced
[42]. These findings suggest that observed differences in screening participation rates
between the incentivized models (FHG and FHO) and FFS model may be due to higher
baseline rates. This in turn may suggest that P4P incentives could be ineffective. It should
be noted that I found poor agreement between physician screening participation rate and
bonus claimed for FHG and FHO physicians. While many physicians claimed a bonus
that matched their observed screening rate, there were many physicians that did not claim
any or the full bonus corresponding to their observed screening rate. There were also
many physicians who claimed a bonus higher than that corresponding to their observed
rate. This may be due to insufficient bonuses, practice culture, administrative burden of
claiming a bonus, and the accuracy in calculations of screening rates by physicians when
claiming a bonus and in my estimates from administrative data. Bonuses claimed by
physicians rather than those corresponding to their observed rate were used to estimate
costs because these payments reflect the true cost to the ministry. While some physicians
may be claiming upwards, currently there is no mechanism for the ministry to audit
bonus claims.
The empirical evidence on the effect of remuneration for cancer screening has not been
widely studied. An analysis of preventive care delivery in Ontario after joining a
reformed model reported that cervical screening rates among physicians joining FHNs
were 1% higher than those joining FHGs [33]. Another Ontario study reported that FHO
physicians were 10% more likely to claim a Pap smear preventive care bonus, which
suggests that they achieve higher screening rates [13]. This is consistent with my finding
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that greater proportions of FHO physicians claimed bonuses than FHG physicians, and
FHO physicians were 45% more likely to claim a bonus than FHG physicians (relative
risk (RR) = 1.45, 95% confidence interval (CI): 1.40-1.51). Previous research suggesting
that capitation performs better is not consistent with my finding since FHOs had slightly
lower rates than FHGs. This may be due to underestimating FHO rates or a true
difference. Pap smears are included in the basket of FHO services, so a physician
receives a fraction of the fee paid to FFS or FHG physicians for providing a Pap smear. It
is plausible that FHO physicians do not consider this payment worth the administrative
burden of submitting a shadow billing claim, which may underestimate my estimates of
FHO screening rates.
There are several reasons why a woman may choose not to be screened for cervical
cancer. Women may not be aware of the risks of cervical cancer or the benefits of
screening, and they may not perceive themselves to be at risk of developing cervical
cancer. Pyschosocial barriers to screening include embarrassment, fear of Pap testing,
lack of a female provider to perform testing and cultural beliefs about cervical cancer and
screening [43]. Despite the best efforts of a woman’s physician, some women may
choose to not participate.
This analysis has several strengths. My results contribute to the literature on the role of
remuneration on quality of care and provide updated estimates on the influence of
incentives on cervical cancer screening in Ontario. These analyses highlight the impact of
incentives on physician behaviour by estimating practice screening rate as an outcome
rather than individual screening status as an outcome variable. Financial incentives are
directed towards physicians not patients, so their impact on clinical practice is
meaningful at the physician level rather than at the patient level. My analysis examines
the influence of incentives across different primary care delivery models in contrast to
previous research that considered all models eligible for incentives as one group [27,32].
I examined both performance and costs to get a better understanding of the impact of
Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus program on cervical cancer screening.
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This analysis also has several limitations. First, I was unable to assess temporal trends in
cervical cancer screening rates. Second, as previously mentioned, if FHO physicians do
not submit shadow billings my estimates of screening rates in this model may be biased
downward. FHO physicians not affiliated with a hospital receive the full laboratory fee
and in theory would submit these claims, which would limit the degree to which my
results underestimate FHO rates. Third, it was assumed that Pap smear delivery costs
(excluding bonus payments) in the FHO model were equal to those in the FFS and FHG
models to simplify calculating the costs of screening. However this assumption may not
hold true in some practices depending on a woman’s use of the healthcare system. For
example, the proportion of capitation payments attributed to screening would be higher
for a woman who only sees her primary care physician once every three years for a Pap
test than a sicker woman who sees her physician monthly. Without knowing the
healthcare utilization of FHO patients, I was unable to assess the impact of this
assumption on my screening cost estimates. Fourth, the switch from the FFS practice to a
FHG or FHO was voluntary; physicians joining a FHG or FHO may differ systematically
by provider behaviour or other unknown physician characteristics. Although I controlled
for several physician and patient characteristics, there may be some selection bias.
Physicians joining a FHG had greater productivity before joining than those that did not
switch [44] and physicians joining FHG or FHO had higher baseline screening rates than
those remaining in the FFS model [40]. Physicians with complex and less affluent
patients were more likely to join a FHG than remain in the FFS model [44] or join a
capitation-based model [45]. Differences in baseline screening, productivity and patient
populations may bias my results. Fifth, I was unable to assess socio-economic status or
ethnicity at the patient-level as only neighbourhood-level data was available. Low
income, certain ethnic groups (e.g. South Asian women) and recent immigration status
are associated with a lack of screening [30,46], so individual-level data on these variables
would have been preferable to include in the model. Finally, my screening estimates are
about 15% higher than those reported by the Ontario Cervical Screening Program
(OCSP) for the same time period [9], which may suggest that my rates are overestimated.
However this difference could be due to differences in study populations. The OCSP
included eligible women aged 20-69, but my analysis was limited to women aged 35-69
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who were enrolled with a FHG or FHO or active patients of a FFS physician. Patients
with a regular family physician may be more health conscious and more likely to be
screened than those without [47-49]. The billing code algorithm used has very high
sensitivity (99%) at the expense of specificity (61%) [30], which may overestimate the
proportion screened. While this may have some upward bias in my screening results, it is
unlikely that my conclusions are affected across primary care delivery model types.

2.5 Conclusions
Ontario’s reforms have shifted the primary care landscape from small private practices
reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis towards interdisciplinary practices with blended
remuneration schemes. Throughout Canada the proportion of physician income coming
from alternative payments is increasing compared to FFS payments [49], so it is
interesting to understand its impact on outcomes. My results contribute to the growing
body of empirical evidence on the effects of remuneration and incentives on quality. I
found significantly higher cervical cancer screening rates among models eligible for
preventive care bonuses than the FFS model. There was a small but statistically
significant difference across remuneration with the enhanced FFS model having higher
rates than the blended capitation model. Average costs per screening were lowest in the
FFS model and highest in the FHO model as a result of bonus payments. However many
physicians claim the highest bonus level, which may be due to historically high screening
rates. Linking bonus payments to change in screening rates may encourage low
performing physicians to improve their screening rates.
Future research can expand on the impact of incentives on other preventive care services
such as breast or colorectal cancer screening or the effect of Ontario’s chronic disease
management incentive on quality of care. Performance could be assessed in other primary
care delivery models. Finally, future research could examine how recent changes to the
target population and coverage period of the Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus for Pap
smears will affect screening rates and costs.
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2.7 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Cumulative preventive care bonuses for cervical cancer screening
Achieved Screening
Participation Rate

Fee Payable

60%

$220

65%

$440

70%

$660

75%

$1,320

80%

$2,200

E(y i )  g1(x i ), y i ~ Bin
g(.)  log it
y i  PCP practice  level screening rate
x i   0  1 programi   2 mean _ agei   3 rurali   4 deprivation i   5instability i 

 6ethnic _ concentration   7 PCP _ gender   8 PCP _ exp erience i   9 screen _ practice _ sizei
Box 2.1: Fractional logit regression used to estimate screening rates


Where programi is a dummy variable representing primary care delivery model. In
regression model 1 programi is equal to 0 for the FFS model and equal to 1 for the FHG.
In regression model 2 programi is equal to 0 for the FHO and equal to 1 for the FHG. In
regression model 3 programi is equal to 0 for the FFS model and equal to 1 for the FHO.
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Table 2.2: Characteristics of study physicians
Model
FFS
FHG
FHO
Total
1,172 (16.1%)
2,847 (39.0%)
3,279 (44.9%)
7,298
N (%)
Age, Years
Mean (95% CI)*
53.7 (52.9-54.5)
52.5 (52.1-52.9)
51.0 (50.7-51.4)
52.0 (51.8-52.3)
Gender, %*
Female
36.3%
40.9%
42.1%
40.7%
Medical Training, %*
IMGs
26.9%
29.3%
11.1%
20.7%
Experience, Years Since Graduation
Mean (95% CI)*
27.1 (26.3-27.9)
26.4 (26.0-26.8)
24.6 (24.3-25.0)
25.7 (25.5-26.0)
Experience Category, %*
< 10 years
15.8%
7.1%
10.0%
9.8%
10-19 years
15.3%
21.6%
22.6%
21.0%
≥ 20 years
68.9%
71.3%
67.4%
69.2%
Number of Patients in Pap Smear Target Population*
Mean (95% CI)
185 (172-190)
293 (286-300)
315 (310-320)
286 (282-289)
Number of Patients in Pap Smear Target Population Category, %*
≤ 100 women
35.4%
14.2%
4.5%
13.3%
> 100 women
64.6%
85.8%
95.5%
86.7%
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization; CI = confidence
interval
* p < 0.001
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Table 2.3: Characteristics of study patients
Model
N (%)
Age, Years
Mean (95% CI)*

FFS
216,609 (10.4%)

FHG
833,706 (40.0%)

FHO
1,033,318 (49.6%)

Total
2,083,633

49.38 (49.3549.42)

49.58 (49.56-49.6)

50.38 (50.3650.40)

49.96 (49.9449.97)

Age Category, %*
35-39 years
21.0%
20.0%
17.7%
19.0%
40-49 years
31.8%
32.2%
30.7%
31.4%
50-59 years
31.7%
32.0%
33.8%
32.9%
60-69 years
15.4%
15.7%
17.7%
16.7%
Rural, %*
Rural
6.1%
2.2%
7.5%
5.2%
Ontario Marginalization Index Quintiles, %
Material Deprivation*†
Q1
23.5%
28.9%
29.4%
28.5%
Q2
20.9%
23.7%
24.2%
23.6%
Q3
20.1%
19.5%
19.6%
19.6%
Q4
17.8%
14.8%
15.0%
15.2%
Q5
16.4%
12.4%
11.0%
12.1%
Missing
1.4%
0.7%
0.8%
0.8%
Dependency*†
Q1
26.6%
28.7%
20.8%
24.5%
Q2
23.8%
26.2%
22.6%
24.1%
Q3
18.9%
18.4%
20.7%
19.6%
Q4
15.0%
13.6%
17.8%
15.8%
Q5
14.4%
12.4%
17.3%
15.0%
Missing
1.4%
0.7%
0.8%
0.8%
Ethnic Concentration*†
Q1
8.4%
6.5%
14.2%
10.5%
Q2
11.0%
10.4%
19.7%
15.1%
Q3
13.9%
13.9%
20.7%
17.3%
Q4
19.6%
20.7%
22.0%
21.2%
Q5
45.8%
47.8%
22.6%
35.1%
Missing
1.4%
0.7%
0.8%
0.8%
Residential Instability*†
Q1
26.2%
32.8%
27.3%
29.4%
Q2
19.0%
20.9%
22.7%
21.6%
Q3
14.5%
13.6%
17.2%
15.5%
Q4
18.5%
16.1%
17.2%
16.9%
Q5
20.5%
15.8%
14.7%
15.8%
Missing
1.4%
0.7%
0.8%
0.8%
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization; CI = confidence
interval
* p < 0.001, † Q1 is the least marginalized & Q5 is the most marginalized
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Table 2.4: Regression model predictions of mean physician practice screening rate
Model
Mean Predicted Screening Rate (95% CI)
Difference
p-value
Model 1: FFS versus FHG
FFS
FHG
74.16% (73.95-74.37) 81.86% (81.69-82.02) 7.70 (7.65-7.74)
< 0.0001
Model 2: FHG versus FHO
FHO
FHG
79.6% (79.43-79.77)
81.88% (81.73-82.04) 2.28 (2.27-2.30)
< 0.0001
Model 3: FFS versus FHO
FFS
FHO
72.51% (72.29-72.73) 78.75% (78.56-78.93) 6.24 (6.21-6.28)
< 0.0001
CI = confidence interval; FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family
Health Organization
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a

b

a

c

d

Figure 2.1: (a) Mean unadjusted physician practice rate by primary care delivery
model; (b): predicted physician practice screening rates from regression model 1;
(c): predicted physician practice screening rates from regression model 2; (d)
predicted physicians practice screening rates from regression model 3
Estimates of mean screening rates in Figure 2.1 (b)-(d) were predicted using the method
of recycled predictions [32].
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Table 2.5: Cumulative preventive care bonuses for Pap smear delivery claimed by
FHG and FHO physicians in 2010/2011
FHG
FHO
2,847
3,279
N
Physician Bonus Claims, N (%)
No claim
1,257 (44.2%)
622 (19.0%)
Bonus claimed
1,590 (55.8%)
2,657 (81.0%)
Performance Level Claimed, N (%)
$220 (60%)
128 (8.1%)
190 (7.2%)
$28,160
$41,800
$440 (65%)
126 (7.9%)
179 (6.7%)
$55,440
$78,760
$660 (70%
120 (7.5%)
216 (8.1%)
$79,200
$142,560
$1,320 (75%)
202 (12.7%)
326 (12.3%)
$266,640
$430,320
$2,200 (80%)
1,014 (63.8%)
1,746 (65.7%)
$2,230,800
$3,841,200
$2,660,240
$4,534,640
Total Payments
FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization

Total
6,126
1,879 (30.7%)
4,247 (69.3%)
318 (7.5%)
$69,960
305 (7.2%)
$134,200
336 (7.9%)
$221,760
528 (12.4%)
$693,000
2,760 (65.0%)
$6,072,000
$7,194,880

Table 2.6: Average costs of delivering cervical cancer screening by primary care
model including bonus payments where eligible
Costs of Cervical Cancer Screening
FFS
FHG
FHO
Total
52,774
233,134
271,241
557,149
1-year Paps, N
$965,764
$4,266,352
$4,963,710
$10,195.827
Pap Delivery
Costs*
$2,660,240
$4,534,640
$7,194,880
Bonus Payments
$965,764
$6,926,592
$9,498,350
$17,390,708
Total 1-year Costs
$18.30
$29.71
$35.02
$31.21
Average cost per
screening
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization;
ICER = incremental cost-effectiveness ratio
* Annual costs of delivering Pap smears where a Pap smear is valued at $18.30.
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FHG
FHO

FFS

Figure 2.2: Predicted screening rates and cost per woman screened
Estimates of mean screening rates in Figure 2.2 were predicted using the method of
recycled predictions [32].
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2.8 Appendices
2.8.1

Appendix A2.1

The Family Health Group (FHG) is an enhanced fee-for-service (FFS) based model,
where physicians may receive additional incentives and premiums. The Family Health
Organization (FHO) is a capitation model, where physicians receive age- and sexadjusted capitation payments and may also receive incentives for enrolled patients.
Common features of both models include: a group practice model, formal patient
enrolment or rostering, after-hours care requirements and performance-based financial
incentives. Organizational and funding characteristics of selected primary care delivery
models are summarized in Table 2.7. One of the key incentives offered exclusively to
physicians practicing in reformed models is the Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus. This
pay-for-performance (P4P) program rewards physicians with stepped payments for
delivering target levels of service coverage among their enrolled patients for five
preventive care services (Pap smears, mammograms, colorectal cancer screening, toddler
immunizations and senior flu shots). With respect to Pap smears, physicians could
receive up to $2,200 depending on the rate of service coverage among enrolled women
aged 35-69 in the prior 30 months (Table 1).

6

6

In fiscal year 2013/2014 the Pap smear target population was expanded to enrolled women aged 21-69
years and the coverage period was extended to 36 months.
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Table 2.7: Characteristics of selected primary care delivery models in Ontario
Model

Fee-for-service
(FFS)

Family Health
Group (FHG)

Family Health
Organization
(FHO)

Year of
introduction

1966

2003

2006

Physician
remuneration

FFS

Enhanced FFS

Blended capitation

Targeted
incentives

No

Yes

Yes

Group
organization

Usually solo
physician-led

Minimum 3
physicians;
physician-led

Minimum 3
physicians;
physician-led

Formal patient
enrolment

N/A

Patients assigned to
virtual roster based
on visit history, but
formal enrolment is
encouraged

Active enrolment
required

Core services

N/A

33 fee codes (e.g.
office visits)

132 fee codes (e.g.
office visits, Pap
smears)

FFS payments

100% schedule of
benefits (SOB) rate

100% SOB rate +
10% premium for
core services
delivered to enrolled
patients

Shadow billings at
15% SOB rate for
core services &
100% SOB rate for
non-core services
delivered to enrolled
patients and all
services to nonenrolled patients

Capitation
payments

N/A

Comprehensive care
management fee for
enrolled patients

Age- and sexadjusted base rate +
access bonus &
comprehensive care
management fee for
enrolled patients

Cumulative
preventive care
bonuses

N/A

Eligible if minimum
roster size of 650
patients met

Eligible; no roster
size requirements

Characteristic
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2.8.2

Appendix A2.2

Table 2.8: Ontario Marginalization Index dimension census indicators
Material
Deprivation

Dependency

Residential
Instability

Ethnic
Concentration

Indicators
Proportion of
population ≥ 15
years that are
unemployed

Proportion of
population ≥ 15
years that are
unemployed*

Proportion of
population living
alone

Proportion of
population that are
recent immigrants (≤
5 years)

Proportion of
population ≥ 20
years without highschool diploma

Proportion of
population ≥ 65
years

Average persons
per dwelling*

Proportion of
population
identifying as visible
minorities

Proportion of
population receiving
government transfer
payments

Dependency ratio:
population 0-14 and
≥ 65 years /
population 15-64
years

Proportion of
dwellings that are
rented*

Proportion of
population
considered low
income

Proportion of
dwellings that are
apartment buildings

Proportion of
families that are
single parent
families

Proportion of
population that
moved within past 5
years

Proportion of
dwellings in need of
major repair

Proportion of
population that are
single, divorced or
widowed*
Proportion of
population ≥ 16
years*

* Census indicators that were reverse coded for the index (i.e. proportion of population <
16 years in census was used to find the proportion ≥ 16 years)
Adapted Matheson et al. 2012 [23]
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2.8.3

Appendix A2.3

Table 2.9: Bivariate analyses of physician factors associated with patient-level
screen status
Screen status
Screened
Not screened
1,671,443 (80.2%)
412,344 (19.8%)
N (%)
Program Model, %*
FFS
73.1%
26.9%
FHG
83.9%
16.1%
FHO
78.8%
21.2%
52.60 (52.59-52.62)
53.65 (53.62-53.68)
Mean Age (95% CI)*
Gender, %*
Female
86.4%
13.6%
Male
75.6%
24.4%
Medical Training, %*
Trained in Canada
79.8%
20.2%
Foreign Training
81.7%
18.3%
Missing
44.8%
55.2%
Experience, Years Since Graduation
Mean (95% CI)*
26.47 (26.45-26.48)
27.42 (27.38-27.45)
Experience Category, %*
< 10 years
80.6%
19.4%
10-19 years
81.6%
18.4%
≥ 20 years
79.8%
20.2%
Number of Patients in Pap Smear Target Population
Mean (95% CI)*
390.09 (389.74-390.44)
381.12 (380.56-381.68)
Number of Patients in Pap Smear Target Population Category, %*
≤ 100 women
76.6%
23.4%
> 100 women
80.3%
19.7%
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization;
PCP = primary care physician
* p < 0.001
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Table 2.10: Bivariate analyses of patient factors associated with patient-level screen
status
Screen status
Screened
Not screened
49.60 (45.59-49.62)
51.38 (51.35-51.44)
Mean Age (95% CI)*
Age Category, %*
35-39
84.0%
16.0%
40-49
81.7%
18.3%
50-59
79.2%
20.8%
60-69
75.0%
25.0%
Rural, %*
Rural
72.2%
27.8%
Urban
80.7%
19.3%
Ontario Marginalization Index Quintiles, %
Material Deprivation*†
Q1 (least marginalized)
84.1%
15.9%
Q2
81.6%
18.4%
Q3
79.1%
20.9%
Q4
76.9%
23.1%
Q5 (most marginalized)
74.7%
25.3%
Missing
74.1%
25.9%
Dependency*†
Q1 (least marginalized)
82.3%
17.7%
Q2
81.5%
18.5%
Q3
79.7%
20.3%
Q4
78.4%
21.6%
Q5 (most marginalized)
77.7%
22.3%
Missing
74.1%
25.9%
Ethnic Concentration*†
Q1 (least marginalized)
75.7%
24.3%
Q2
77.5%
22.5%
Q3
79.2%
20.8%
Q4
81.5%
18.5%
Q5 (most marginalized)
82.6%
17.4%
Missing
74.1%
25.9%
Residential Instability*†
Q1 (least marginalized)
83.1%
16.9%
Q2
81.0%
19.0%
Q3
79.0%
21.0%
Q4
78.1%
21.9%
Q5 (most marginalized)
77.6%
22.4%
Missing
74.1%
25.9%
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization;
PCP = primary care physician
* p < 0.001
† Q1 is the least marginalized & Q5 is the most marginalized
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100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
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50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
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10.0%
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35-69

35-39

FFS

40-49
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FHG

FHO

50-59

60-69

Total

Figure 2.3: Mean unadjusted physician practice screening rate by age group and
primary care model
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2.8.4

Appendix A2.4

Table 2.11: Parameters from fractional logit models predicting screening rates
Regression Model

1: FFS-FHG
 (SE)

2: FHO-FHG
 (SE)

3: FFS-FHO
 (SE)

Characteristic
Intercept
0.046 (0.423)
1.698 (0.461)**
-0.229 (0.453)
Program Model†
0.463 (0.031)***
0.151 (0.023)***
0.349 (0.034)***
Mean Patient Age
0.009 (0.009)
-0.020 (0.009)^^
0.016 (0.009)^
% Rural
-0.021 (0.117)
-0.44 (0.092)
0.250 (0.066)**
% Deprivation Q1&2
0.651 (0.094)***
0.749 (0.097)***
0.798 (0.106)***
% Ethnic Con. Q1&2
-0.682 (0.102)***
-0.756 (0.075)***
-0.832 (0.073)***
% Instability Q1&2
0.113 (0.103)
0.142 (0.070)^^
-0.067 (0.010)
Female PCP
0.496 (0.029)***
0.543 (0.023)***
0.551 (0.025)***
< 10 Years Experience
-0.083 (0.032)^^
0.010 (0.026)
0.004 (0.028)
10-19 Years
-0.109 (0.046)^^
0.043 (0.041)
-0.09 (0.037)^^
Experience
≤ 100 patients in Pap
0.221 (0.039)***
0.346 (0.052)***
0.093 (0.045)^
smear target population
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization;
SE = standard error; Q = quintile; PCP = primary care physician
† Program = FHG in Models 1&2 and program - FHO in Model 3
^ p < 0.1, ^^ p < 0.05, * p < 0.01, ** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.0001
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2.8.5

Appendix A2.5

Table 2.12: Bivariate analyses of factors associated with claiming a Cumulative
Preventive Care Bonus for Pap smear coverage
Characteristic
Bonus Claimed
No Bonus Claimed
4,247 (69.3%)
1,879 (30.7%)
N (%)
Program Model, %*
FHG
55.8%
44.2%
FHO
81.0%
19.0%
50.71 (50.41-51.01)
54.01 (53.48-54.54)
Mean Age (95% CI)*
Gender, %*
Female
79.7%
20.3%
Male
62.0%
38.0%
Medical Training, %*
Trained in Canada
72.6%
27.4%
Foreign Trained
55.9%
44.1%
Experience, Years Since Graduation
Mean (95% CI)*
24.47 (24.16-24.78)
27.73 (27.18-28.27)
Experience Category, %*
< 10 years
71.6%
28.4%
10-19 years
74.0%
26.0%
≥ 20 years
67.5%
32.5%
Number of Patients in Pap Smear Target Population Category, %*
≤ 100 women
22.4%
77.6%
> 100 women
74.0%
26.0%
FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization; CI = confidence
interval
* p < 0.001
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Chapter 3

3

Costs of Cervical Cancer Treatment: Estimates from
Ontario, Canada

3.1 Introduction
The leading cause of death in Canada is cancer, which accounts for nearly 30% of all
deaths [1]. Cancer is one of the most costly diseases [2], so it is no wonder that the
economic burden of cancer is substantial in Canada. The direct cost of cancer care in
Canada in 2008 was estimated at $4 billion [3]. Cervical cancer is the second leading
cause of cancer death among Ontario women aged 20 to 44 years [4], and the fourth most
common cause of cancer death among women worldwide [5]. During their lifetime, one
in 145 Ontario women will be diagnosed with cervical cancer, and each year in Ontario
610 women are diagnosed with cervical cancer and 150 will die from cervical cancer [1].
Treatment for cervical cancer is complex, which may include surgery, chemotherapy and
radiation therapy. Among Ontario women diagnosed with cervical cancer in 2003/04,
over 30% of patients received chemotherapy and an estimated 55% received radiation
therapy [6]. More than half of Ontario cervical cancer patients had a cancer-related
surgical procedure, and each case had an average 1.5 hospital admissions within 12
months of diagnosis [6]. Resource consumption is highest during the initial phase of
treatment and the terminal phase before death [7]. Resource consumption in the first year
after diagnosis is very high as this is the period when cervical cancer patients undergo
primary treatment and experience the greatest mortality [8,9].
Estimates of the costs of cancer care are necessary inputs for economic evaluations,
policy decisions and forecasting future medical care expenditures relating to cancer
treatment. However there are few studies estimating the costs of cervical cancer treatment
in Canada. To the best of my knowledge, no Canadian study has examined cervical
cancer costs beyond the first year after diagnosis or accounted for variable lengths of
follow-up. Moreover, previous publications on cost estimates using Ontario
administrative data did not include costs associated with visits to cancer clinics or
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dialysis clinics or mental health admissions as these data were not available before 2007.
The objective of this study is to fill this gap by providing estimates of the total direct
medical care costs of treating cervical cancer in the first three years post-diagnosis from
the perspective of the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC). I
accounted for censoring while estimating the cost of cervical cancer.

3.2 Methods
3.2.1

Patient Cohort

Ontario women aged 35 to 69 years with incident primary cases of cervical cancer
(International Classification of Disease, ninth revision, ICD-9 180.x) diagnosed between
January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010 were identified from the Ontario Cancer
Registry (OCR). The study index date for each patient was her date of diagnosis. Baseline
characteristics included age at diagnosis, rural residence, number of Johns Hopkins
Aggregated Diagnosis Groups (ADGs) and expected resource utilization band (RUB).
Note that cost data are unavailable for cancer clinic visits, dialysis clinic visits and mental
health hospital admissions before 2007. Since exclusion of these costs may underestimate
the total medical care costs, I did not performe cost analyses for patients diagnosed prior
to January 2007.

3.2.2

Data Sources

Data were obtained from the Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences (ICES), which
holds population-based health administrative databases needed for this study. The OCR is
a population-based registry containing all incident cases of cancer and cancer deaths in
Ontario. Cervical cancer cases were identified from the OCR and were linked to other
administrative health databases using unique, encoded identifiers and analysed at ICES.
The Registered Persons Database (RPDB) contains demographic information on all
individuals covered by the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP). The OHIP claims
database contains all fee-for-service billing claims made by Ontario primary care
physicians, specialists and other health care providers in private practice, hospital or other
health facilities. The Client Agency Program Enrolment (CAPE) tables contain patient
rosters of primary care physicians who receive age- and sex-adjusted capitation payments
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for each enrolled patient. Shadow billings claimed by primary care physicians and other
providers in alternative payment plans are captured by the OHIP claims database. The
Canadian Institute for Health Information Discharge Abstract Database (CIHI-DAD)
contains administrative and clinical data on all inpatient hospitalizations. The National
Ambulatory Care Reporting System (NACRS) holds records of all ambulatory visits to
Ontario hospitals. NACRS captures data on emergency department (ED) visits, same day
surgery (SDS) procedures and visits to ambulatory clinics, such as regional cancer
centres and dialysis clinics. The National Rehabilitation Reporting System (NRS)
database holds data on all admissions to rehabilitation beds in hospital. The Continuing
Care Reporting System (CCRS) provides information on individuals receiving long-term
care in complex continuing care beds. The Ontario Mental Health Reporting System
(OMHRS) captures administrative and clinical data on all adult mental health admissions.
The Home Care Database (HCD) contains demographic and service information for
individuals receiving in-home services. The Ontario Drug Benefit (ODB) Program
provides prescription drug coverage to individuals aged 65 and older, residents of longterm care facilities and other groups. ODB database contains prescription drug costs for
those aged 65 and older. The Office of the Registrar General collects vital statistics on
Ontario residents including date and cause of death.

3.2.3

Cost Estimates

Estimates of total direct medical care costs were computed using the %getcost SAS
macro developed for ICES data holdings [11]. The macro uses entries in a number of
administrative databases to calculate total medical care costs for a defined time period.
Costs captured include those from cancer clinic visits, hospital-based care, tertiary care,
physician services, outpatient prescription drugs (ODB recipients) and other sources of
care (Table 3.1). Cancer clinic costs captures all costs associated with chemotherapy,
radiation therapy and other cancer-related services.
The ICES cost macro use both top-down and bottom-up costing methodology depending
on the type of cost [11]. When unit prices are unavailable, the top-down method is used
to assign costs using the average cost of a given metric (e.g. per diem cost or relative
value weights). The following costs were calculated using the top-down approach:
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inpatient hospitalizations, same-day-surgery procedures, ED visits, dialysis clinic visits,
cancer clinic visits, rehabilitation admissions, mental health admissions, complex
continuing care and long-term care. The unit cost for inpatient hospitalizations, SDSs, ED
visits, rehabilitation and ambulatory clinic visits is the Cost Per Weighted Case (CPWC)
[12]. All patients are assigned a Resource Intensity Weight (RIW) based on Case Mix
Group, which estimates expected resource utilization relative to the average patient (RIW
= 1). Total spending is divided by the sum of all RIWs to obtain CPWC. The cost of a
specific case is the product of assigned RIW and CPWC (Box 3.1). Longer episodes of
care, such as mental health or complex continuing care admissions, have a unit cost of
Cost Per Weighted Day (CPWD). For each patient stay, Case Mix is periodically
assessed to assign a relative weight for each day of care, which estimates an overall
weighted length of stay (LOS). Case cost is the product of CPWD and weighted LOS.
Bottom-up costing methods assign unit costs associated with a particular procedure,
service or drug. The following costs were calculated using the bottom-up approach: home
care services, outpatient physician visits and procedures, prescription drugs, outpatient
laboratory tests and other outpatient services covered by OHIP. Records of healthcare
utilization in the HCD, ODB and OHIP databases are multiplied by the associated unit
cost set by the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care to estimate overall
resource consumption. Capitation payments for patients in the CAPE tables are calculated
by age and sex.
Costs were computed from the date of diagnosis until December 31st of that year or death
if earlier. Subsequently annual costs were computed until the earliest of the following
events: 1) death or 2) December 31st, 2010. Costs for each year were adjusted for
inflation to 2010 Canadian dollars using the Statistics Canada’s Consumer Price Index for
healthcare.

3.2.4

Analysis

Descriptive results are reported for baseline characteristics of the study cohort. Mean
costs and mean cumulative costs were calculated each year following diagnosis for this
cohort. Costs were broken down by resource category to identify the largest drivers of
cost in each year of treatment. Complete cost data are available for cases where death is
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observed. However, differential follow-up due to varying index dates means that some
cases are censored (i.e. those who do not die during the study period and have incomplete
cost data). Thus, I estimated costs using three methods: a) naïve estimator, b) simple
weighted estimator proposed by Bang and Tsiatis (B&T) in 2000 and c) an improved
estimator adapted by Pfeifer and Bang (2005) from B&T’s estimators.
Equation 3.1: The naïve estimator for estimating costs of a cohort of patients

m̂ =

1 n
å M i.
n i=1

(1)

In equation (1), m̂ is the estimated arithmetic mean costs, Mi is cost accumulated by
patient i during a given time period. The estimates based on equation (1) will bias the
mean downward as costs accrued after observed follow-up are equated to zero [13,14].
Estimates from only complete observations will be biased upward to patients with shorter
survival time [14]. Applying standard survival analysis techniques to costing analyses is
also invalid as censoring and cost are not independent [12,15,16]. Patients that slowly
accumulate costs are more likely to be censored than high cost users; therefore the mean
is biased upward [15,16]. Given that censoring increases with follow-up, appropriate
statistical methods that address censoring are required to reduce bias in estimates of costs.
Simple Weighted Estimator: One way to improve the naïve estimator is to estimate
mean time-restricted cost in the presence of censoring using inverse probability
weighting. Complete cases are those that die or are observed until the end of the study
interval. Costs are weighted by the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the inverse probability of
not being censored at the end of the interval. In 2000, B&T proposed a simple weighted
estimator, which averages the weighted overall costs of complete cases for the entire
study period.
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Equation 3.2: The simple weighted estimator for estimating costs of a cohort of
patients

m̂WT =

1 n Di M i
.
å
n i=1 K̂(Ti )

(2)

In equation (2), m̂WT is estimated mean costs based on the simple weighted estimator, Ti
indicates a failure time and Ci indicates a censored time. Observed follow-up time, Xi =
min(Ti, Ci), ∆i = I(Ti≤C). I(.) is the indicator function where I=1 indicates a failure and
I=0 indicates a censored observation. T is bounded by the maximum follow-up time L,
where Ti≤L and Pr(Ci≥L)>0. K(Ti) is the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the probability of not
being censored at failure time Ti or censoring time Ci. Estimates based on equation (2)
allows for continuous death and censoring times, and provides a consistent estimate of
mean cumulative medical care cost [13,17,18]. However, this estimator is inefficient as it
relies on costs from patients with complete data and may be unstable with heavy
censoring [13,17].
Improved Weighted Estimator: The improved partitioned B&T estimator attempts to
improve upon the simple weighted estimator by using data from censored cases if
detailed cost history is available [17]. The study period is partitioned into smaller
intervals where complete cases die during or are observed until the end of a given interval
[17]. The simple weighted method is used to estimate accumulated cost in each interval
and the weighted costs across all intervals are summed [17]. The partitioned estimator is
usually, but not necessarily, more efficient than the simple weighted estimator [17].
Zhao and Tian adapted the improved B&T method to propose an estimator that is more
efficient and convenient, but does not require detailed cost history or partition the study
period [13,19]. This analysis used the improved estimator proposed by Pfeifer and Bang,
which is a simpler, user-friendly formula adapted from Zhao and Tian [20].
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Equation 3.3: The improved weighted estimator for estimating costs of a cohort of
patients
n

1 n Di M i 1 n (1- D i ){M i - M (Ci )}
m̂ IMP = å
+ å
; M (Ci ) =
n i=1 K̂(Ti ) n i=1
K̂(Ci )

å I(X

j

³ Ci )M j (C j )

j=1

.

n

å I(X

j

³ Ci )

j=1

(3)

In equation (3), m̂ IMP is the estimated mean costs based on the improved estimator, M(Ci)
is the mean cost of all individuals still under observation at censoring time Ci, Xj indicates
that individual j is still under observation beyond individual i’s censoring time, and
Mj(Cj) is the cost accumulated by individual j at time Ci.
The improved estimator has two parts: 1) mean cost of complete cases estimated by the
simple weighted B&T method; 2) an efficiency term that estimates the costs of censored
cases [18]. Censored costs are adjusted by subtracting the mean cost of all other cases
still under observation at that censoring time. Adjusted censored costs are then weighted
by the Kaplan-Meier inverse probability of not being censored at that time. The
efficiency term is the average of weighted censored costs.
Overall and specific costs during the first year after diagnosis were estimated without
taking censoring into account for the cohort and by one-year vital status. Cumulative
overall and cancer clinic costs were estimated using naïve, simple weighted and
improved weighted estimators for years one through three following cervical cancer
diagnosis. Annual overall and cancer clinic costs were also estimated using naïve, simple
weighted and improved weighted estimators for the first three years post-diagnosis. All
analyses were conducted using SAS and Zhao and Wang’s SAS code was used for
censored cost estimators [14].

3.3 Results
The study cohort included 784 cases of cervical cancer diagnosed between 2007 and
2010. Mean age at diagnosis was 49 years, and baseline characteristics are summarized in
Table 3.2. About 32% (254) of patients died within three years of diagnosis and 71%
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(181) of deaths were caused by cervical cancer. Vital status and cause of death
information were available to a later date than cost data were for the whole cohort.
Therefore there are some patients who died within a year of their diagnoses, but their cost
data are censored before their death. In the first year after diagnosis about 27% of the
cohort had censored cost data. Administrative censoring increased steadily and by the end
of year three almost 65% of patients had censored cost data (Table 3.3). Throughout the
study period, there were 78 cases that died within three years of diagnosis whose cost
data were not observed at their time of death.
Table 3.4 reports the mean costs for the study cohort and by one-year vital status without
taking censoring into account. Overall mean costs during the first year post-diagnosis
were $35,700 (standard error [SE]: $1,239). Mean costs were much higher among those
who died within one year from diagnosis ($63,016; SE: $4,246) compared to those
surviving longer than one year ($31,195; SE: $1,177). The highest cost category was
cancer clinic costs (41%) for those who survived one year or longer (Table 3.4; Figure
3.1) and inpatient hospitalization (54%) for patients who died within a year (Table 3.4;
Figure 3.2). Mean overall and cancer clinic costs by one-year vital status estimated using
the simple weighted and improved methods are summarized in Appendix 3.1 Table 3.6.
Mean cumulative costs estimated using naïve, simple weighted and improved methods
are reported in Table 3.5 and Figure 3.3. Annual costs were highest during year one
($40,231; SE: $1,356) and decreased during subsequent two years ($14,459; SE: $1,787)
and three ($9,383; SE: $1,678). Estimates of mean cost that did not account for censoring
were consistently lower than the B&T estimators. Mean cumulative one- and three-year
costs were $35,700 (SE: $1,239) and $45,317 ($1,942), respectively, when using naïve
methods. Using the improved estimator, cumulative one- and three-year costs were
$40,231 ($1,356) and $59,314 ($2,898), respectively. Estimates using simple weighted
and improved methods were similar, but the variance of the improved estimator was
smaller and thus more efficient. Cancer clinic costs were $14,124 (SE: $370) in year one
and $16,434 (SE: $545) during years one through three (Appendix 3.1 Table 3.7).
Specific costs estimated using simple weighted methods are presented in Appendix 3.1
Table 3.7.
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3.4 Discussion
This study estimated direct medical care costs of cervical cancer patients in Ontario
during the first three years following diagnosis of cervical cancer. Cumulative three-year
cancer clinic and overall costs were $16,434 and $59,314 per case, respectively. Cost
accumulation was greatest during the first year after diagnosis. This seems reasonable
since treatment is most aggressive during this period [7,8,10]. Annual total medical care
costs decreased from $40,231 per case in the first year post-diagnosis to $14,459 during
year two and $9,383 during year three. Patients who died within one year from diagnosis
had much higher one-year costs ($66,250) than patients who survived at least one year
($35,759).
I found that cancer clinic and hospital admissions were the two largest drivers of costs in
the first year after diagnosis. These cost categories capture costs associated with cancerrelated treatments such as chemotherapy, radiation therapy and cancer-related surgeries.
A previous study of cancer costs in Ontario also found that inpatient hospitalizations and
cancer-related care were the two greatest sources of cost [10]. My estimate of inpatient
admissions ($6,914) was similar to those of de Oliveira et al ($6,761). However, my
estimate of cancer-related care ($12,941) was much higher than their estimates of
chemotherapy ($804) and radiation therapy ($3,468) combined. This difference is likely
due to my estimates including all cancer clinic visits, which are not limited to
chemotherapy and radiation therapy, and include additional services such as palliative
care, surgical oncology and supportive services. Furthermore, de Oliveira et al may have
underestimated the costs of radiation therapy as the cost per fraction of radiation was
estimated using data from the 1990s.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first Canadian study of medical care costs
associated with cervical cancer patients that takes censoring into account. A previous
Ontario study reported mean one-year costs of $18,055 (2009 Canadian dollars) for
cervical cancer patients who survived one year and $41,536 for cases who died within
one year [10]. My naïve estimates are much higher, which is due to different estimation
methods of cancer-related costs and inclusion of costs associated with rehabilitation,
mental health admissions, dialysis clinic visits, and all OHIP billings. As far as I know,
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there are no Canadian studies of cervical costs beyond year one to compare with my
results. Resource consumption was highest during year one, accounting for 67% of
cumulative three-year costs. This result is similar to Insinga et al’s finding that 69% of
three-year costs were incurred during year one [9]. Similar to other studies of cervical
and other cancer patients, I found that patients who died had much higher mean costs
than those surviving [8,10]. End-of-life care is a significant source of cancer costs; the
cost of care for Ontario genitourinary/gynaecologic cancer patients during the six months
before death was estimated at $23,770 [21].
My study has several strengths. First, I reported overall and specific medical care costs of
cervical cancer treatment for the first year and beyond the first year after diagnosis. My
cost estimates may be useful for economic evaluations of interventions to prevent
cervical cancer and calculation of life-time cervical cancer related costs. Second, I
accounted for censoring to reduce bias in my cost estimates. My naïve cost estimates
were much lower than those estimated using the simple weighted and improved methods.
Thus, previous cost estimates of cervical cancer care reporting naïve estimates are likely
underestimated, so my estimates are more likely to represent the true cost of treatment.
Third, I included all medical care costs covered by the Ontario Ministry of Health and
Long-Term Care. Estimates of overall resource utilization may be of use for decisionmakers to identify and implement preventive intervention strategies. Finally, my cost
estimates are more reliable for conducting cost-effectiveness analyses.
This study has several limitations. First, costs are highly skewed and estimates of mean
cost are influenced by high-users. Second, cancer staging data were not available for the
study cohort. Cancer stage is associated with survival, which affects resource utilization.
Third, I assessed overall medical care costs of cervical cancer patients instead of net costs
of cervical cancer patients. Fourth, the ODB provides prescription drug coverage for
women aged 65 years and older, so I was unable to capture the costs of drugs associated
with treatment for younger patients. However chemotherapy, the largest
pharmacotherapy cost, is administered in hospital and captured by my estimates of cancer
clinic costs. A limitation of using administrative databases and the ICES cost macro is
that I was unable to separate healthcare utilization unrelated to a patient’s cancer
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diagnosis. However I expect costs unrelated to cancer is likely to be small for this patient
population. Finally, data limitations precluded me from estimating the costs of treatment
beyond three years following diagnosis.

3.5 Conclusions
This study analyzed the overall and specific medical care costs of treating cervical cancer
in the first three years following diagnosis of cervical cancer in Ontario. By taking
censoring into account, my estimates are more likely to reflect the true cost of cervical
cancer treatment in Ontario. Overall medical care costs were approximately $40,000 in
year one, $14,000 in year two and $9,000 in year three. Costs associated with cancer
clinic visits and inpatient admissions were the two largest sources of cervical cancer
treatment costs. However, physician services and home care were also significant drivers
of costs. My estimates may be of use for future economic evaluations of human
papillomavirus vaccines, screening strategies or interventions to improve screening.
Decision-makers may also find my estimates useful for policy planning or projecting
future costs.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Source database and costing methodology used to estimate costs
Resource

Source Database

Costing Methodology

Cancer clinic visits

FY2006-: NACRS

CPWC; top-down

Inpatient hospitalizations

CIHI-DAD

Top-down: CPWC

Same day surgery procedures

NACRS

Top-down: CPWC

Emergency department visits

NACRS

Top-down: CPWC

Dialysis clinic visits

FY2006-: NACRS

Top-down: CPWC

Rehabilitation admissions

NRS

Top-down: CPWC

Mental health admissions

FY2006-: OMHRS

Top-down: CPWD

Complex continuing care

CCRS

Top-down: CPWD

Long-term care

FY2005-FY2008:
OHIP & ODB

Top-down: CPWD

Hospital-based care

Tertiary care

FY2009-: CCRS
Home care services

HCD

Bottom-up: billing based

FFS physician billings

OHIP

Bottom-up: billing based

Physician shadow billings

OHIP

Bottom-up: billing based

Primary care capitation
payments

CAPE

Age- & sex-adjusted
payment

Prescription drugs

ODB

Bottom-up: billing based

Non-physician OHIP billings

OHIP

Bottom-up: billing based

Laboratory billings

OHIP

Bottom-up: billing based

Physician services

Other

NACRS = National Ambulatory Care Reporting System; CIHI-DAD = Canadian Institute
for Health Information Discharge Abstract Database; NRS = National Rehabilitation
Reporting System; OMHRS = Ontario Mental Health Reporting System; CCRS =
Continuing Care Reporting System; HCD = Home Care Database; OHIP = Ontario
Health Insurance Plan; ODB = Ontario Drug Benefit; CAPE = Client Agency Program
Enrolment; CPWC = Cost Per Weighted Case; CPWD = Cost Per Weighted Day
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Table 3.2: Baseline demographic characteristics of cervical cancer patients
Characteristic
N

784

Diagnosis (ICD-9), N (%)
Endocervix (1800)

139 (17.7%)

Exocervix (1801)

21 (2.7%)

Other specified sites (1808)

23 (2.9%)

Site unspecified (1809)

601 (76.7%)

Age at diagnosis, years
Mean (95% CI)

49.3 (48.7-50.0)

Median (IQR)

48 (42-56)

Age category, N (%)
35-39

120 (15.3%)

40-49

317 (40.4%)

50-59

223 (28.4%)

60-69

124 (15.8%)

Rural resident, N (%)
No

729 (93.7%)

Yes

49 (6.3%)

Missing

6

Number of ADGs, N (%)
0

26 (3.3%)

1-3

265 (33.8%)

4-6

389 (49.6%)

7-10

75 (9.6%)

≥ 11

29 (3.7%)

ICD-9 = International Classification of Disease, 9th edition; CI = confidence interval; IQR
= interquartile range; ADGs = Aggregated Diagnostic Groups
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Top-down methods
( )

(1)
(2)

( )

∑

Bottom-up methods
(3)
(4)
Box 3.1: Estimating medical costs using top-down and bottom-up costing methods
Where Case Costij is the cost of patient i hospital j. RIWi(y) is the resource intensity
weight of patient i during episode of care y, and CPWCjy is cost per weighted case for
episode of care y at hospital j. CMIitj is case mix index of patient i at on day t at hospital j
and T is the total number of days of stay. LOSitj is the weighted length of stay of patient i
on day t at hospital j and CPWDi(y) is the cost per weighted day for episode of care y at
hospital j. Bottom-up methods multiply the unit cost of a given procedure, visit, service
or drug by the times used by a given patient.
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Table 3.3: Distribution of complete and censored observations during the first three
years after cervical cancer diagnosis
Interval

Vital status

N*

Complete
observations**

Censored
observationsº

Proportion
censored‡

Year 1

Total

784*

570

214

27.3%

Deaths

111

99

12

Alive

673

471

202

Years 1-2

Years 1-3

Year 2

Years 2-3

Year 3

Total

784*

416

368

Deaths

210

160

50

Alive

574

256

318

Total

784*

280

504

Deaths

254

176

78

Alive

530

104

426

Total

471*

317

154

Deaths

99

61

38

Alive

372

256

116

Total

471*

181

290

Deaths

143

77

66

Alive

328

104

224

Total

256*

120

136

Deaths

44

16

28

Alive

212

104

108

46.9%

64.3%

32.6%

61.6%

53.1%

* number of individuals under observation at start of interval; ** number of individuals with
complete cost data during interval (cases with observed cost data until death or interval end); º
number of individuals censored during interval (cases that died during interval but with cost data
censored before death and living censored cases); ‡ proportion censored during interval
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Table 3.4: Average total medical care costs and specific medical care costs
associated with cervical cancer cases in the first year after diagnosis
Sample

Survived longer
than one year

Died within one
year

Overall

N

673

111

784

Total cost

$31,195 ($1,177)

$63,016 ($4,246)

$35,700 ($1,239)

Cancer clinic

$12,941 ($401)

$10,623 ($1,003)

$12,613 ($373)

Resource

Hospital-based care
Inpatient hospitalization

$6,914 ($560)

$31,088 ($3,048)

$10,337 ($712)

Same day surgery

$894 ($41)

$459 ($81)

$832 ($38)

ED visits

$637 ($43)

$1,651 ($143)

$781 ($44)

Dialysis clinic

$74 ($62)

$746 ($740)

$169 ($117)

Rehabilitation
admissions

$204 ($118)

$0 ($0)

$175 ($101)

Mental health
admissions

$156 ($136)

$0 ($0)

$134 ($117)

Complex continuing
care

$604 ($459)

$4,002 ($1,498)

$1,045 ($449)

Long-term care

$13 ($13)

$255 ($256)

$47 ($38)

Home care

$1,432 ($176)

$4,128 ($566)

$1,814 ($174)

Tertiary care

Physician services

$6,062 ($168)

$8,113 ($458)

$6,352 ($160)

Prescription drugs

$1,034 ($171)

$1,777 ($273)

$1,139 ($152)

Other*

$230 ($10)

$173 ($20)

$222 ($9)

* Other costs include laboratory costs and non-physicians services covered by OHIP.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors
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Figure 3.1: Resource utilization of cervical cancer patients in the first year after
diagnosis among those surviving one year or longer
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Figure 3.2: Resource utilization of cervical cancer patients in the first year after
diagnosis among those that died within one year
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Table 3.5: Mean annual and cumulative medical care costs associated with cervical
cancer cases during years one through three after diagnosis
Proportion  (SE)
censored**

WT (SE)

IMP (SE)

Interval

N*

Year 1

784

27.3%

$35,700
($1,239)

$39,995
($1,513)

$40,231
($1,356)

338 (3)

Years 1-2 784

46.6%

$43,086
($1,785)

$50,792
($2,731)

$52,544
($2,276)

622 (8)

Years 1-3 784

64.3%

$45,317
($1,942)

$61,586
($5,199)

$59,314
($2,898)

873 (15)

Year 2

471

32.1%

$12,293
($1,581)

$14,184
($2,043)

$14,459
($1,787)

334 (4)

Years 2-3 471

61.6%

$16,007
($1,992)

$25,336
($4,258)

$22,409
($2,749)

628 (11)

Year 3

53.1%

$6,833
($1,134)

$10,258
($2,138)

$9,383
($1,678)

347 (4)

256

Mean
F/U Time
(SE)‡

* sample size at start of interval; ** proportion of sample censored during interval; ‡
follow-up time in days

 = naïve mean not accounting for censoring; SE = standard error; WT = mean estimated
using simple weighted method; IMP = mean estimated using improved method; F/U =
follow-up
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative overall medical care costs of cervical cancer patients in the
first three years after diagnosis
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3.8 Appendices
3.8.1

Appendix A3.1 Supplementary Tables

Table 3.6: Mean overall and cancer-specific costs of cervical patients during the first
year after diagnosis by one-year vital status
N

Proportion
censored

 (SE)

WT (SE)

imp (SE)

Overall

673

30.0%

$31,195
($1,177)

$35,543
($1,538)

$35,759
($1,351)

Cancer clinic

673

30.0%

$12,941
($401)

$14,184
($447)

$14,628
($394)

Overall

111

10.8%

$63,016
($4,246)

$65,585
($4,159)

$66,250
($4,084)

Cancer clinic

111

10.8%

$10,623
($1,003)

$11,140
($1,049)

$11,194
($1,015)

Vital status
Alive

Died

 = naïve mean not accounting for censoring; SE = standard error; WT = simple
weighted mean; imp = improved mean improved.
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Table 3.7: Comparison of mean cancer clinic costs across different estimation
methods
Proportion  (SE)
censored**

WT (SE)

IMP (SE)

$12,613 ($373)

$13,747 ($414)

$14,124 ($370)

46.6%

$13,526 ($410)

$14,946 ($562)

$15,168 ($446)

Years 1-3 784

64.3%

$13,803 ($430)

$15,755 ($894)

$16,434 ($545)

Year 2

471

32.1%

$1,520 ($172)

$1,792 ($247)

$1,755 ($215)

Years 2-3 471

61.6%

$1,980 ($252)

$2,639 ($614)

$2,713 ($384)

Year 3

53.1%

$848 ($220)

$914 ($894)

$1,131 ($545)

Interval

N*

Year 1

784

27.3%

Years 1-2 784

256

* sample size at start of interval; ** proportion of sample censored during interval

WT = naïve mean not accounting for censoring; SE = standard error; WT = mean
estimated using simple weighted method; IMP = mean estimated using improved method
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Table 3.8: Source specific cumulative costs estimated using the simple weighted
estimator
Resource

Year 1
(cumulative)

Year 2
(cumulative)

Year 3
(cumulative)

Overall

$39,995 ($1,1513)

$50,792 ($2,731)

$61,586 ($5,199)

Cancer clinic

$13,747 ($414)

$14,946 ($562)

$15,755 ($894)

Inpatient
hospitalization

$11,773 ($861)

$16,113 ($1,312)

$19,919 ($2,171)

Same day surgery

$851 ($45)

$936 ($113)

$1,101 ($113)

ED visits

$880 ($56)

$1,190 ($80)

$1,411 ($143)

Dialysis clinic

$90 ($75)

$421 ($393)

$1,531 ($1,502)

Rehabilitation
admissions

$248 ($144)

$557 ($278)

$857 ($443)

Mental health
admissions

$190 ($165)

$60 ($35)

$83 ($50)

Complex continuing
care

$1,382 ($611)

$1,209 ($327)

$1,702 ($499)

Long-term care

$16 ($16)

$25 ($25)

$56 ($0)

Home care

$2,203 ($233)

$3,267 ($360)

$4,494 ($687)

Physician services

$6,985 ($197)

$9,595 ($938)

$11,219 ($1,291)

Prescription drugs

$1,395 ($211)

$2,129 ($293)

$3,026 ($587)

Other*

$235 ($11)

$235 ($23)

$422 ($34)

Hospital-based care

Tertiary care
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Chapter 4

4

An Economic Analysis of Financial Incentives for
Cervical Cancer Screening in Ontario’s Primary Care
Delivery Models

4.1 Introduction
Cervical cancer screening with the Papanicolaou (Pap) smear test can prevent cervical
cancer by detecting and treating cervical dysplasia before it becomes malignant [1-3].
Screening may also detect earlier stage cancers, requiring less invasive treatment and
better survival than symptomatic cancers [1]. The impacts of screening on cervical cancer
incidence and mortality have been consistently demonstrated in epidemiological studies
[4-7] and screening is considered cost-effective [8].
Despite the benefits of screening and universal access to cancer screening, many
Canadian women are not screened at the recommended interval, and Canadian screening
rates are consistently lower than rates in the US [9,10]. Ontario guidelines recommend
that women who are or ever have been sexually active between the ages of 21 and 69 are
screened with a Pap smear once every three years [2,3]. Screening participation in
Ontario, Canada’s largest province, has improved slightly over the past decade, but is still
well below the provincial target of 85% [11]. Between 2009 and 2011 only 65% of
women aged 21 to 69 years were screened [11]. Given the risks of screening noncompliance, there is a clear need to increase screening participation rates.
In an attempt to improve the delivery of preventive health care services, such as Pap
testing, Ontario underwent a series of primary care reforms in the early 2000s. The
Ontario government introduced reformed primary care models with alternative physician
remuneration to traditional fee-for-service (FFS) payments and pay-for-performance
(P4P) incentives to improve delivery of preventive healthcare services. The two dominant
models are the Family Health Group (FHG) and Family Health Organization (FHO),
which have enhanced FFS and blended capitation reimbursement schemes, respectively.
The FHG and FHO offer patient enrolment, enhanced access and special premiums and
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incentives, such as the Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus, which are unavailable in the
traditional FFS model. The Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus is a P4P program where
physicians are awarded stepped payments for achieving targeted participation levels.
With respect to Pap testing, physicians may receive between $220 and $2,200 in bonuses
for achieving the lowest and highest participation levels, respectively (Appendix 4.1).
Alternative funding plans and performance incentives are becoming increasingly popular
both in the Canada and worldwide; however there is no conclusion on the effectiveness of
incentives or on the optimal incentive to deliver high quality care [12-15]. There is
limited evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives for improving cancer
screening rates, and to the best of my knowledge, there has been no cost-effectiveness
analysis of financial incentives for improving cervical cancer screening rates.
In this study, I used estimated cancer screening rates from three primary care delivery
models in Ontario to determine the cost-effectiveness of screening in the following
settings: 1) FFS without P4P incentives (i.e. traditional FFS); 2) FFS with P4P incentives
(i.e. FHG); and 3) capitation with P4P incentives (i.e. FHO).

4.2 Methods
4.2.1

Model Description

I adapted a previously published model of the natural history of cervical cancer [16-18].
Every 6 months my microsimulation model tracks women through a series of health
states representing the progression from infection with human papillomavirus (HPV) to
cervical intraepithelial neoplsia (CIN) and eventually to invasive cervical cancer (Figure
4.1). Women may progress, regress or remain in a given health state up to the cervical
cancer health state where regression is no longer permitted. Natural history parameters
are age-specific and dependent on HPV type (low-risk versus high-risk type) [16-20].
In addition to the natural history model, my microsimulation model incorporates
screening, follow-up of abnormal results and treatment of cervical cancer precursors. The
following assumptions were made for this analysis: (i) 13% of women are never
screened, 70% are screened within three years and the remaining women are screened
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sporadically once every six years [21,22]; (ii) in each cycle women have an age-specific
probability of being screened [11]; (iii) Pap smear sensitivity and specificity are agedependent [23-25]; (iv) women have an age-specific probability of following up with
abnormal test results [11,26,27]; (v) only infections with high-risk HPV may progress to
cancer; (vi) women with biopsy confirmed CIN grade 2/3 (CIN23) and cancer were
compliant with treatment; (vii) women with undiagnosed cancer may progress to
subsequent stages based on values found in the literature [16,17]; (viii) women in the
model face age-specific probabilities of non-cervical cancer-related death [28] and
hysterectomy [29]. See Appendix 4.2 for detailed model figures.
My model was developed in two steps. First, the natural history parameters of a model
with entry to the well state at age 12 were calibrated to match age-specific prevalence of
HPV [19,30-36] and incidence of cervical cancer [7,37]. Where possible Canadian data
were selected for calibration. Additional calibration targets included the stage distribution
of cervical cancer cases [11] and the ratio of deaths to incident cases [18,38]. Ranges of
parameters (incidence, progression and regression of HPV infection; progression and
regression of CIN) found in the literature were tested in the model until an acceptable fit
was found. After selecting a set of natural history parameters (Tables 4.1 and 4.2), model
entry age was changed to 35 years and women enter different initial health states to
match the observed distribution of states from model calibration. The model entry and
exit ages (35 and 70 years, respectively) were chosen to match the target population of
the Cumulative Preventive Care bonus. Second, a decision model with three arms
representing FFS, FHG and FHO was created using TreeAge Pro 2014. Each arm
represents a different primary care model and holds the microsimulation model
developed in step one. Across all three arms, all parameters are the same except for agespecific cancer screening rates and the cost of a screening Pap smear [39].

4.2.2

Primary Care Model Screening Rates

The results of the traditional FFS model were compared to FFG and FHO models. I also
compared the results of FHO with FHG. The proportions of regular, sporadic and never
screened women were altered to reflect the differences in overall screening rates across
the three primary care models (Table 4.3).
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4.2.3

Cost and Effectiveness Data

All cost and effectiveness data utilized in the microsimulation model are summarized in
Table 4.4. The costs of screening and repeat Pap smears include both the delivery and
laboratory costs [40]. Physicians practicing in the traditional FFS model do not receive
incentives for cancer screening, so the cost of a screening Pap smear in this model is the
base (delivery and laboratory) cost of a test [40]. In the FHG and FHO models, the costs
of screening Pap smears also include the costs of bonuses paid to physicians [39]. The
cost of a repeat Pap smear is the base cost in all three primary care models. Colposcopy
and treatment of CIN were estimated using the provincial fee schedule and data found in
the literature [18,25,40]. Cancer treatment costs were estimated from patient-level data on
women diagnosed with cervical cancer in Ontario between 2007 and 2010 [41].
Treatment costs include total medical care costs after accounting for censoring and were
adjusted by cancer stage using stage-specific cost distributions found in the literature
7

[16,17,42]. I included treatment costs for the first three years after diagnosis as during
this period most cancer-related costs are accumulated [43,44]. Health-related quality of
life associated with different cervical cancer progression states were obtained from the
published literature [17,45-48]. Utility values for healthy individuals were taken from
published literature using the Health Utilities Index Mark-3 [45], and disease state
utilities were based on time trade-off methods, the Health Utilities Index Mark-2 and the
Health and Activities Limitation Index [17,46-48]. Utilities were used to estimate effects
using quality-adjusted life years (QALYs).

4.3 Results
4.3.1

Model Calibration

Figure 4.2 presents the model predicted and observed age-specific HPV prevalence rates.
Figure 4.3 presents the model predicted and observed age-specific incidence of cervical
cancer. HPV prevalence reaches a peak around age 20 and decreases until around age 50,

7

Mean cancer cost was assumed to represent treatment costs for stages 2-3 cancers. The percentage
differences from stage 2-3 costs to stage 1 and stage 4 cancers found in the literature were then applied to
my estimates of mean treatment costs.
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after which it starts to increase again [19,31,32,33]. Incidence of cervical cancer peaks
between the ages of 40 and 44 and then decreases thereafter [7]. The model predicted
stage distribution of cases was similar to observed data [11], as was the predicted ratio of
cervical cancer cases to related deaths (0.29) was similar to observed data (0.30) [18,38].

4.3.2

Model Results

Table 4.5 presents the expected lifetime numbers of cervical cancer cases, stage
distribution of cases and cancer-related deaths associated with the different primary care
models. The traditional FFS model and FHO were associated with the lowest and highest
expected cases of cervical cancer, respectively. The FHG and FHO models were
associated with the lowest and highest numbers of expected cervical cancer-related
deaths, respectively. However the FHG had the lowest ratio of deaths to incident cases
(0.25) and the traditional FFS model had the highest (0.31). The FHG and FHO models
were associated with greater proportions of stage I cases than the traditional FFS model.
The costs and effects, measured in QALYs, are summarized in Table 4.6 (first two
columns) and the efficiency curve for the three primary care models is presented in
Figure 4.4. Effects were fairly similar across all three models and only differed by about
0.1-0.2 QALYs. Costs were lowest in the traditional FFS model and highest in the FHG.
Compared to the traditional FFS model, the FHO model is more costly and slightly more
effective. The FHG model is the most costly model, but slightly more effective than the
FFS while not more effective than the FHO.
Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) are summarized in Table 4.6 (last two
columns) Relative to the traditional FFS model, one would need to spend about an extra
$8,000 for each additional QALY in the FHO model. Compared to the FFS model, an
extra $23,500 is needed for each QALY gained in the FHG. The FHG is more costly and
less effective than the FHO, so it is dominated.

4.4 Discussion
My results suggest that there are similar QALYs and different costs for cervical cancer
screening in Ontario’s primary care delivery models. The traditional FFS model is the
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least costly and least effective. The Family Health Group, an enhanced FFS model
featuring pay-for-performance incentives, is dominated, as it is the most costly, but not
most effective compared to FHO. The FHO, a blended capitation model featuring payfor-performance incentives, is the most effective and less costly than the FHG model.
I found similar effects across all three models, which is somewhat surprising and my
results should be interpreted with caution. In theory, the primary care model with the
highest screening rate would have the greatest QALYs. There are several reasons that
may explain why this was not the case in my data. The incidence of cervical cancer in
Canada is low (age-standardized incidence rate: 7.8 per 100,000 women) [49], so small
differences in screening rates (<10%) may not affect the number of cases diagnosed in a
meaningful way. Another contributing factor may be the stage distribution of cases across
primary care models. Model predictions show that the FHG and FHO were associated
with higher proportions of stage I cases than the FFS model, and it is possible that this is
the result of earlier diagnoses. The FHG had the highest screening participation rate
overall and among the oldest age category (60-69 years). My model endpoint is when
screening cessation is recommended at age 70. It is plausible that women screened during
their 60s in the FHG may be asymptomatic cases that would be missed by the other
models. Furthermore, the FHG and FHO had fewer expected deaths to incident cases.
It is not surprising that the FHG and FHO have the highest costs. Physicians practicing in
a traditional FFS practice do not receive financial incentives for meeting Pap smear
quality targets, so the cost of screening is much lower in this model than in those
featuring bonuses. Furthermore, the FHG has the highest screening participation rate,
which greatly increases the costs of delivering screening. With more screening tests
performed in the FHG, the volume of follow-up investigations for abnormal tests and
treatments for CIN are also higher, which has a substantial impact on cost. While the cost
of treating a cervical cancer patient is much higher than to treat a case of CIN, the volume
of cancers is so low that screening and follow-up costs are substantially higher than
cervical cancer treatment costs. Considering that bonus payments nearly double the cost
of a screening Pap smear and increase the service volume, it is expected that overall
screening costs would be highest in the model with the highest screening rate.
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My findings are generally consistent with past research suggesting that increased cervical
cancer participation (through more frequent screening) is not cost-effective [50-52].
However these findings should be interpreted with caution as while the costs of screening
are high, it has caused drastic declines in both incidence and mortality [7]. This study and
its results present a unique addition to the literature on the cost-effectiveness of cervical
cancer screening. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first economic analysis of
financial incentives for cervical cancer screening. Indeed, the evidence on the costeffectiveness of incentives for all conditions is extremely limited [13]. Compared to the
traditional FFS model, my findings indicate that a capitation model featuring P4P
incentives is cost-effective and that an enhanced FFS model is dominated compared to
FHO.
There are several limitations to my analyses. As in all economic analyses of cervical
cancer screening, there is uncertainty in the natural history data. I attempted to address
this by calibrating my model to observed Canadian epidemiological data. Another
potential limitation is that the Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus guidelines expanded
the target population to women aged 21 to 69 years in 2013. I was unable to capture how
this will affect screening among younger women and their lifetime risk of cervical
cancer. Future studies of cervical cancer screening in Ontario should address this change.
My model did not account for the vaccination status of women. However this may not
have affected my target population as vaccination is recommended to take place during
adolescence. Furthermore, there is limited data on how the HPV vaccine performs in
populations or its the long-term effects [25,53]. Finally, my results may not be
generalizable to other jurisdictions in Canada.

4.5 Conclusions
In conclusion, my results suggest that a capitation model with financial incentives may be
more cost-effective than FFS models with and without incentives at delivering cervical
cancer screening. Future research within Ontario should explore the effects of the new
Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus guidelines on the costs of screening and predicted
risk of cervical cancer. Future research may build upon my results by investigating the
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cost-effectiveness of capitation systems without incentives, and salaried models with and
without incentives.
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4.7 Tables and Figures

HR HPV

CIN1

CIN2/3

Stage I

…

well

Stage
IV
LR HPV

CIN1

CIN2/3

Figure 4.1: Natural history of cervical cancer
Well indicates no infection with human papillomavirus (HPV) or cervical disease. HR
HPV indicates infection with high-risk type HPV and LR HPV indicates infection with
low-risk type HPV. CIN1 and CIN23 indicate cervical intraepithelial neoplasia (CIN)
grades one and two or higher, respectively. Stage I indicates stage one cervical cancer,
which may progress to stage two and so on until stage four cancer. At any point women
in the model may die or receive a hysterectomy unrelated to cervical cancer. In the
absence of screening, women with cervical cancer may only be diagnosed if they become
symptomatic.
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Table 4.1: Natural history parameters for HPV and CIN
Variable

High- risk HPV

Low-risk HPV

13

0.0036

0.0014

14

0.0182

0.0071

15

0.0369

0.0144

17

0.0446

0.0173

19

0.0857

0.0333

20

0.0770

0.0300

30

0.0182

0.0071

40

0.0145

0.0057

45

0.0109

0.0042

50

0.0190

0.0063

13

0.280

0.230

35

0.174

0.143

0.08

0.045

13

0.006

0.006

35

0.01

0.02

To well

0.15

0.162

To HPV infection

0.062

0.09

To well

0.001

0.003

To HPV infection

0.01

0.02

To CIN1

0.002

0.03

13

0.08

0.04

35

0.12

0.045

Incidence of HPV infection [16-20]

Regression from HPV to normal [16,17,20]

Progression from HPV to CIN1 [16,17,20]

Progression from HPV to CIN23 [16,17,20]

Regression from CIN1 [16,17,20]

Regression from CIN23 [16,17,20]

Progression from CIN1 to CIN23 [16,17,20]

HPV = human papillomavirus; CIN1 = cervical intraepithelial neoplasia grade 1; CIN23 =
cervical intraepithelial neoplasia grades 2-3
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Table 4.2: Cancer progression parameters
Variable
Progression from CIN23 to cancer by age [16-18,20]

High-risk HPV

15

0.0005

20

0.0008

25

0.0065

30

0.015

35

0.0255

40

0.028

45

0.0335

50

0.032

55

0.022

60

0.0180

65

0.015

70

0.025

Cancer stage progression [16,17]
Stage I to II

0.15

Stage II to III

0.16

Stage III to IV

0.225

Probability of symptoms [16,17]

5-year survival [16,17]

Stage I

0.078

84.04%

Stage II

0.120

66.32%

Stage III

0.368

40.29%

Stage IV

0.684

15.83%

HPV = human papillomavirus; CIN1 = cervical intraepithelial neoplasia grade 1;
CIN23 = cervical intraepithelial neoplasia grades 2-3
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Table 4.3: Screening participation, screening test characteristics and follow-up
variables
Variables

FFS

FHG

FHO

35

76.3%

85.5%

82.7%

40

72.9%

83.6%

80.1%

50

69.7%

82.0%

78.3%

60

66.4%

79.2%

75.0%

Screening rate [39]

Test characteristics [23-25]

Sensitivity

Specificity

CIN1

CIN23

<CIN1

15

0.42

0.57

0.97

35

0.32

0.38

0.982

12-month follow-up abnormal results [11,26,27]
Low-grade abnormality (ASCUS, LSIL)

0.81

High-grade abnormality (ASC-H, HSIL)

0.90

FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health
Organization; ASCUS = atypical cells of unknown significance; LSIL = low-grade
squamous intraepithelial lesions; ASC-H = atypical cells of undetermined significance;
HSIL = high-grade squamous intraepithelial lesion
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Table 4.4: Cost and effectiveness variables
Cost variables
Screening Pap smear [39,40]
FFS

$18.30

FHG

$29.71

FHO

$35.02

Repeat Pap smear [40]

$18.30

Colposcopy and biopsy [20,40]

$152.60

CIN treatment [18,20,40]

$1,105

Cancer treatment [16,17,41,42]
Stage I

Stages II-III

Stage IV

Year 1

$25,345

$40,231

$55,116

Year 2

$9,109

$14,459

$19,809

Year 3

$5,911

$9,383

$12,855

Health-related quality of life [45]
Low-grade abnormality [46]

0.97

High-grade abnormality [46]

0.93

Detected cancer [17,46-48]

In treatment

Post-treatment

Stage I

0.80

0.90

Stages II-III

0.67

0.90

Stage IV

0.48

0.62

FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization
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0.3

HPV prevlanece

0.25

0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

0
0
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Age (years)
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60

Sellors 2000 HR

Sellors 2000 All

Moore 2009 All

Ogilvie 2011 HR

Mayrand 2006 HR

Bruni 2010 HR

Ratnam 2009 HR

Richardson 2003 All

Richardson 2003 HR

Model predict All types

70

80

Model predicted HR types

Figure 4.2: Observed and model predicted age-specific prevalence of high-risk (HR)
human papillomavirus (HPV) types and all types of HPV from model calibration
Note that HR types include all carcinogenic HPV types: -16, -18, -31, -33, -35, -39, -45, 51, -52, -56, -58, -59, -68, -73, -82.
Note that observed results come from the literature [19,30-36].
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Incidence per 100,000 women

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
15

20

25

30

35
40
45
Ages (years)

Dickinson 2012

50

55

60

65

Model predicted

Figure 4.3: Observed and model predicted age-specific incidence (per 100,000
women) of cervical cancer from model calibration
Note that observed results come from Dickinson et al. (2012) [7].
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Table 4.5: Model predicted cervical cancer cases, stage distribution and deaths
Primary care model
Traditional FFS

Cases

Deaths

Death to case ratio

424

131

0.309

118

0.255

138

0.291

Stage I

50.47%

Stage II

27.12%

Stage III

15.80%

Stage IV

6.61%

FHG

463

Stage I

57.67%

Stage II

26.78%

Stage III

8.86%

Stage IV

6.69%

FHO

474

Stage I

60.12%

Stage II

23.00%

Stage III

10.34%

Stage IV

6.54%

FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health
Organization
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Table 4.6: Model predicted costs and effects by primary care delivery model and
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios
Model

Costs (CAD $)

Effects
(QALYs)

ICER

ICER relative
to FFS

FFS

450.36

28.3552

-

-

FHO

633.34

28.3781

$7990.39

$7990.39

FHG

678.69

28.3649

Dominated

$23,539.18

ICER = incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; FFS = fee-for-service; FHO = Family
Health Group; FHG = Family Health Organization

800
700

FHG
FHO

Costs (2010 $CAD)

600
500
FFS
400
300
200
100
0
28.35

28.355

28.36
28.365
28.37
Quality-adjusted life years

28.375

28.38

Figure 4.4: Efficiency curve of costs versus effects (quality-adjusted life years)
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4.8 Appendices
4.8.1

Appendix A4.1

Table 4.7: Cumulative preventive care bonuses for cervical cancer screening

4.8.2

Achieved Screening
Participation Rate

Fee Payable

60%

$220

65%

$440

70%

$660

75%

$1,320

80%

$2,200

Appendix A4.2 Microsimulation Model Figures

Figure 4.5: Decision analytic model
Each arm in the decision arm represents a different primary care delivery model
(traditional fee-for-service [FFS], Family Health Group [FHG], Family Health
Organization [FHO]), and at the end of each arm is a microsimulation model of the
natural history of cervical cancer that incorporates screening, follow-up and treatment of
abnormal results, and cancer treatment.
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Figure 4.6: Health states in the microsimulation model
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Figure 4.7: Natural history model of cervical cancer and allowable health state
transitions
Note that women may be infected with low-risk or high-risk human papillomavirus
(HPV) types and that both low-risk and high-risk infections may progress to cervical
intraepithelial neoplasia (CIN) grade 1 (CIN1) or grades 2-3 (CIN23). However only
CIN23 infected with high-risk HPV types may progress to invasive cervical cancer.
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Figure 4.8: Follow-up of abnormal Pap smear results
ASCUS = atypical squamous cells of unknown significance; LSIL = low-grade squamous
intraepithelial lesion; HSIL = high-grade squamous intraepithelial lesions; ASC-H =
atypical cells of unknown significance – cannot exclude HSIL.
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Chapter 5

5

Conclusions

5.1 Summary and Concluding Statements
I compared cervical cancer screening rates among three of Ontario’s dominant primary
care delivery models: the traditional fee-for-service model, the Family Health Group and
the Family Health Organization. My results suggest that there are significant differences
in screening participation rates between models after controlling for patient and physician
characteristics. The FHG, an enhanced FFS model where physicians are eligible for
financial incentives, was observed to have the highest screening participation rate. The
blended capitation model (i.e. FHO) had the second highest screening rate, and the
traditional FFS model, in which physicians do not receive bonuses for screening, had the
lowest screening rate.
Screening rates were used to populate a decision analytic model consisting of three
Monte Carlo microsimulation models representing the FFS, FHG and FHO models. This
model was developed from previously published models of cervical cancer screening [13] and calibrated to match observed data from Ontario [4-13]. Analysis of the overall and
specific costs of Ontario women diagnosed with cervical cancer was conducted to
estimate the treatment costs associated with cervical cancer.
Results from the economic model suggest that the FHO is cost-effective relative to the
traditional FFS model and that the FHG is dominated by the FHO. However, the model
predicted effects were similar across the three primary care models and the FHG had the
lowest death to incident case ratio. The FHG and FFS models were the most and least
costly, respectively, but the difference in cost was about $230. It is not surprising that the
FHG has the highest costs as it features screening bonuses to physicians. Furthermore the
FHG has the highest screening rate, which increases the costs of delivering Pap smears
and costs associated with follow-up of abnormal results. The model predicted the FHO
and traditional FFS model to be the most and least effective, respectively, with a
difference of 0.023 quality-adjusted life years. Compared to the traditional FFS model,
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one would need to spend an additional $8,000/QALY in the FHO, which is considered
cost-effective with a willingness to pay of $50,000/QALY.
Despite the FHG having significantly higher screening rates than the FHO, it had slightly
lower quality-adjusted life years. The incidence of cervical cancer in Canada is very low,
so small differences in screening rates may not have a large effect. As mentioned
previously, my model tracked women until age 70, so higher screening rates may be
effective at diagnosing cases at earlier stages and ages. However this potential effect is
likely to be minimal as peak incidence occurs while women are between the ages of 40
and 45 years [13].
These results may be useful for decision makers and aid in policy development. Both
reformed models featuring P4P incentives, FHG and FHO, had greater QALYs and are
cost-effective relative to the traditional FFS model. It should also be noted that I was
unable to assess screening rates before incentives were introduced and that differences in
screening rates by physician primary care model may have existed prior to primary care
reform [14]. Considering that $28.3 million was spent on cervical cancer screening
bonuses between 2006/2007 and 2009/2010 and the limited effectiveness of the program,
its continuation remains an open question [14].
Future research can build upon these analyses in several ways. First, I was unable to
assess temporal trends in cervical cancer screening, and an economic analysis that
accounts for baseline differences in screening rates is warranted. Second, the cervical
cancer Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus guidelines recently changed to include women
aged 21 to 34 years in the target population. This may affect screening participation and
costs. Third, the effects of the breast cancer and colorectal cancer Cumulative Preventive
Care Bonuses on screening rates, incidence and mortality have not been widely studied.
Financial incentives have been shown to have no effect on breast cancer screening in
Ontario [14,15]. However one study reported a near 10% increase in colorectal cancer
screening after incentives were introduced, which is much larger than the estimated 3%
increase for cervical cancer [15]. Given that colorectal screening incentives are more
effective at improving participation and that the incidence of colorectal cancer is greater
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than that of cervical cancer, incentives for colorectal cancer screening may be costeffective and an economic analysis is warranted. Finally, I did not include salaried
physicians in my analyses. Future work could expand my study of the effects of
remuneration on cervical cancer screening to include salaried physicians.
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Supplementary Appendix

Appendix A: Dataset Creation Plan

Dataset Creation Plan
Name and Number of Study
Research Program
Contacts
Who will be responsible for DCP
updates?
PIA Approved?
DCP update history
1st Draft: November 20, 2013

Short Description of Research
Question

List of Datasets Used

Cost-Effectiveness of Cervical Cancer Screening in Primary
Care Funding Models
PCPH
Ciara Pendrith
Sisira Sarma
Amardeep Thind
Ciara Pendrith
No

Objectives:
To conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis of financial
incentives for cervical cancer screening in Ontario’s
primary healthcare delivery models.
To assess which of the reformed primary health care
model is the most cost-effective in delivering cervical
cancer screening.
To determine the target level of screening participation at
which incentives could be cost-effective.
Main population of interest:
Female patients aged 35 to 69 years and without prior cervical
cancer diagnoses or hysterectomy in the province of Ontario
between the years 2005 and 2010.
Main outcomes of interest:
Outcomes are screening rates & associated costs, incidence
(number of patients diagnosed with cervical cancer per year in
various models), primary treatment type & associated costs,
overall survival and 5-year survival.
1. CPDB (required from January 1, 2005 to March
31, 2011)
2. CAPE (available from January 1999, required from
January 1, 2005 to March 31, 2011)
3. RPDB (available from 1990, required from January
1, 2005 to December 31, 2012)
4. OHIP (available from January 1991, required from
January 1991 to December 31, 2012)
Claim Type
All
Code Types
Fee codes
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Diagnosis codes
5. OCR (available from 1964, required from 1964 to
December 31, 2011)
6. IPDB (available from 1992, required December 31,
2010
7. CIHI-DAD (available from 1986, required from
1986-2011 to identify total abdominal
hysterectomy)
1. For look-back period
Reference date
Do not include index date in look-back period (stop at
index-1)

Other Details

Time Frame Definitions

Accrual Window

Look-back Window

Max Follow-up Date

Observation Window

Date
PartIndex
A –Event
Physician
& toScreening
Cohorts
(in which
look for outcomes)

Accrual Start/End Dates
Max Follow-up Date
Lookback Window(s)

March 31, 2011
March 31, 2011
3 years to identify adequately screened women
Maximum lookback date: April 1, 2008

Cohort Selection
Cross-sectional analysis of population-based cohort
March 31, 2011
Inclusion Criteria Part 1 – Defining the Physician Sample See Table 1a for format
1. Using CPDB, select full-time comprehensive primary care physicians
affiliated with a FHG, FHO or traditional FFS model on March 31, 2011.
Exclude physicians with a narrow scope of practice (e.g. sports medicine,
counselling, psychotherapy, etc)
Part 2 – Defining Physician Patient Populations (Screening Cohort) See Table 1b
for format
1. Identify patient populations of physician sample that are eligible for cervical
cancer screening on index date
2. Select female patients aged 35 to 69 years inclusive on index date that are
formally rostered to sample physicians affiliated with a FHG or FHO model
3. Analyze OHIP billings using the ICES algorithm to define practice
populations of physicians affiliated with the traditional FFS model and select
female patients aged 35 to 69 years inclusive on index date
Exclusions
1. Invalid IKN
(In order)
2. Evidence of death of patient on or before the index date
3. Non-Ontario residents
4. Evidence of history of cervical, endometrial or ovarian cancer diagnoses.
Defined by codes in Appendix A in the DXCODE variable in OCR between
1964 and March 31, 2008
5. Evidence of prior hysterectomy. Defined by procedure codes in Appendix B
Index Event
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6.
Size of Cohort

in CIHI-DAD between 1986 and March 31, 2011
Evidence of HIV infection by entry in HIV database up to March 31, 2011

Enter total size of cohort when available

Part B – Cancer Cohort
Accrual Start/End Dates
Max Follow-up Date
When does observation
window terminate?
Lookback Window(s)

January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2010
December 31, 2012
Patients will be followed from index event until end of follow-up or date of
death
10 years to assess screening history. Farthest lookback date: January 1, 1995

Cohort Selection
Index Event

Retrospective cohort study
Cancer diagnosis

Defining the Cancer Cohort
Inclusion Criteria

1.
2.

Exclusions
(In order)

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
Size of Cohort

See Table 1c for format
Using RPDB, identify women aged 35-69 at risk for cervical cancer each year
between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2010
Using OCR, identify all patients diagnosed with cervical cancer between
January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2010 defined by ICD-9 codes in Appendix
C in the DXCODE or DXCODE_RES
Invalid IKN
Evidence of death of patient on or before the index date
Non-Ontario residents
Evidence of history of cervical, endometrial or ovarian cancer diagnoses.
Defined by codes in Appendix A in the DXCODE variable in OCR between
1964 and December 31, 2004
Evidence of prior hysterectomy. Defined by codes in Appendix B in CIHIDAD between 1986 and December 31, 2004
Evidence of HIV infection by entry in HIV database prior to index date

Enter total size of cohort when available

Variable Definitions
Main Exposure or
Risk Factor

Primary Care Funding Model
1. Traditional FFS – control
2. Blended FFS (FHG) – treatment
3. Blended capitation (FHO) – treatment
Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus
1. Traditional FFS – control
2. FHG & FHO – treatment

Baseline
Characteristics
Part A

Assessed at index date
Physician Characteristics (CPDB, CAPE, IPDB, OHIP)
1. Encrypted OHIP number from PHYSNUM (or other physician identifier)
(CPDB)
2. Age from BDATE (IPDB)
3. Gender from SEX (IPDB)
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Year of graduation from GRADYEAR (IPDB)
International medical graduate status from IMG (IPDB)
Family Health Team membership status (CPDB)
Group affiliation at index date and date of eligibility for that group from
GRPNUM & STRTELIG from the PHYS_AFFILIATION dataset (CPDB)
Patient enrolment model type from PROGTYPE (for FHG & FHO
physicians) (CAPE)
Screen eligible practice size (CAPE, OHIP)

Patient Characteristics (RPDB, CAPE)
1. Age, from %getdemo
2. Ontario Marginalization Index
3. Rurality index as per ICES algorithm (RPDB)
4. Include the following program enrolment variables: STATUS_CAPE,
PROGTYPE, PHYSNUM (CAPE)
5. Physician number and model type for patients of FFS physicians
Baseline
Characteristics
Part B

Outcome
Definitions

Part A

Outcome
Definitions
Part B

Assessed at index date (cancer diagnosis)
Cancer Cohort Characteristics (RPDB, OCR, CAPE, OHIP)
1. Ontario Marginalization Index
2. Rurality index as per ICES algorithm (RPDB)
3. Include the following program enrolment variables: STATUS_CAPE,
PROGTYPE, PHYSNUM (CAPE)
4. Include physician number and model type for patients of FFS physicians
5. Diagnosis date from DXDATE & DXDATE_FLAG (OCR)
6. Age at diagnosis from AGE (OCR)
7. ICD9 reportable status & ICD9 resolved site from DXCODE &
DXCODE_RES (OCR)
8. Histology and histological behaviour from HIST, HIST_RES, BEHAVIOR,
BEHAVIOR_RES (OCR)
9. ACG score (use shorter version)

Part A
Screening Outcomes
1. Screening Rates (OHIP) see table 2a for format
 Identify screening rate of each physician’s patient population on index date
 Patients are considered screened if they have at least one claim to OHIP
with any of the fee codes in Appendix D within the past three years (April
1, 2008 – March 31, 2011)
 Stratify by age groups: 35-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69
2. Screening Costs (OHIP) see table 2b for format
 Identify preventive care bonuses claimed by each eligible FHG and FHO
physician on March 31, 2011 from OHIP Architected Payments database
 Applicable bonuses are defined by fee codes in Appendix E

Cancer Cohort Outcomes
1. Screening History (OHIP) see table 3 for format
 Link cancer cases to OHIP claims database to identify screening history
 For all cancer cases, identify three most recent Pap smear billed to OHIP
prior to date of diagnosis – look back a maximum of ten years

126

 Include dates of tests billed
Diagnosis & Pre-Cancer Treatments (OHIP)
 For all cancer cases, identify colposcopies and procedures (defined by
claims with fee codes in Appendix F) to treat pre-cancers billed to OHIP
prior to date of diagnosis – look back a maximum of two years. Include
FEECODE, FEESUFF, DXCODE, SERVDATE
3. Total Healthcare Costs (OHIP)
 Run cost macro (%getcost) for each cancer case yearly from date of
diagnosis until date of death or end of follow-up
4. Mortality (RPDB)
 Identify any deaths & cause of death from RPDB
2.

Outline of Analysis Plan
1.

2.

3.

4.



5.


6.

7.


Screening participation rates
Calculate the proportion of women adequately screened by primary care funding model and age
group
Screening bonus payments
Document the number of physicians in each funding model claiming each bonus level
Follow-up of abnormalities
Estimate the number and proportion of women receiving colposcopy and other procedures to
follow-up abnormal Pap results
Incidence of cervical cancer
Estimate the at risk populations and proportions diagnosed with cervical cancer each year between
2005 and 2010
Estimate proportions of cases diagnosed through screening and interval detection
Using Kaplan-Meier survival analysis, estimate progression from date of last normal or abnormal
screen to date of cancer diagnosis
Cervical-cancer related mortality & survival
Document the number and proportion of cancer cases that have a cancer-related cause of death
Using Kaplan-Meier survival analysis, estimate 2- and 5-year cervical cancer survival from date of
diagnosis to date of death
Total healthcare costs for cancer patients after diagnosis
Estimate total healthcare costs of women diagnosed through screening and interval detection after
diagnosis
Cost-effectiveness analysis
A decision analytic model will be used to assess the cost-effectiveness of financial incentives for
cervical cancer screening. Transition probabilities between health states will be estimated using
screening, cancer progression and survival rates. Costs of screening, diagnosis and cancer
treatments will be estimated from OHIP billings and cost macro results. Quality-adjusted-lifeyears will be estimated from the product of published state-specific utilities and time spent in each
health state
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